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THE POLITICAL ASSASSINATION OF EDMUND RANDOLPH: 
GEORGE WASHINGTON'S PRESIDENTIAL AFFAIR OF HONOR 
By 
John C. Kotruch 
University of New Hampshire, September, 2010 
On 19 August 1795 George Washington ambushed Secretary of State Edmund 
Randolph in an impromptu tribunal to face the allegation of treasonous corruption in the 
service of France with evidence covertly provided by Great Britain. 
A synthesis of the biographies of Washington and Randolph, histories of Jay's 
Treaty, the Whiskey Rebellion, the Battle of Fallen Timbers, and the diplomatic 
correspondence between Great Britain and the United States during the early republic 
reveals the motivations behind a British plot to manipulate the composition of the United 
States' government by implicating Randolph. The study dispels the myth that the 
intercepted French diplomatic correspondence was forwarded by the British government 
to Washington's administration to compel the ratification of Jay's Treaty, and for the first 
time places Randolph's forced resignation in the context of an eighteenth-century affair 
of honor between President George Washington and the Secretary of State. 
v 
INTRODUCTION 
George Washington and the early republic faced myriad challenges during the 
early years of the federalist era. George Washington was inaugurated as the president of 
an occupied country in 1789 with Great Britain and Spain garrisoning forts within United 
States territory and along its borders as they continued their pursuit of hegemony in North 
America. Immediately after Washington's inauguration, Great Britain and Spain 
threatened war in Europe and North America over their competing claims to Nootka 
Sound in the Pacific Northwest just as France's Third Estate transformed itself into a 
National Assembly and took their famous tennis court oath that placed France on the path 
to revolution. In an attempt to gain control over U.S. territory and provide the requisite 
security for burgeoning westward expansion, George Washington and the federal 
government waged war from 1790 through 1795 against Native Americans armed and 
supplied by European protagonists along the northern and southern flanks of the United 
States.1 
As Washington and the new federal government struggled to hold the fragile 
union together and establish a secure frontier, France declared war on both Spain and 
Great Britain in 1793, plunging Europe into war and necessarily creating an alliance of 
imperial powers on the flanks of the United States. As Washington held to a strict policy 
of neutrality in the war in Europe, Great Britain began unannounced seizures of all 
shipping in the Atlantic bound for France as it increased its pressure on the northern U.S. 
1
 Bemis, Jay's Treaty: A Study in Commerce and Diplomacy, 3; Weber, The Spanish Frontier in North 
America, 268-270; Evans, "The Nootka Sound Controversy in Anglo-French Diplomacy-1790," 609-611; 
Palmer, The Age of Democratic Revolution, 480, 481; Sword, President Washington's Indian War: The 
Struggle for the Old Northwest 1790-1795. 
1 
border through its Native American allies, moving Great Britain and the United States to 
the brink of war in 1794. 
For the first time since independence the early republic began to gain control over 
its own destiny in 1794. Anthony Wayne's 20 August 1794 victory at the Battle of Fallen 
Timbers deflated the British-Indian alliance in the Old Northwest as the federal 
government concurrently assembled a militia to march against rebellious U.S. citizens in 
the Western Counties of Pennsylvania to quell the Whiskey Rebellion. In November, 
1794, shortly after the British-Indian alliance of the Old Northwest was crushed by the 
Battle of Fallen Timbers, Great Britain agreed to a "Treaty of Amity and Commerce" 
negotiated in London by John Jay to shunt the threat of war between the United States 
and Great Britain in the same month that the defeated Native Americans of the Old 
Northwest agreed to a peace with the United States to be concluded the following 
summer.2 
In June, 1795, Major General Anthony Wayne welcomed the Indian 
confederations of the Old Northwest at Fort Greenville and concluded the Treaty of 
Greenville on 3 August, 1795, securing a peace in the Old Northwest that opened the 
lucrative territory of the Northwest Ordnance to American settlers. That same June, 
Thomas Pinckney was welcomed in Madrid to begin negotiations over the contested 
southwestern border of the United States with Spanish Florida and the critical issue of 
U.S. access to the Mississippi River all the way to the Gulf of Mexico. 
2
 Gaff, Bayonets in the Wilderness: Anthony Wayne's Legion in the Old Northwest, 319-325; Reardon, 
Edmund Randolph: A Biography, 272, 273; Combs, The Jay Treaty: Political Battleground of the Founding 
Fathers, 157, 158. 
3
 Sword, Washington's Indian War, 314-329; Bemis, Pinckney's Treaty: America's Advantage from 
Europe's Distress, 287-294. 
2 
On 19 August 1795, the day after George Washington forwarded the recently 
ratified Jay Treaty to Great Britain, with the Treaty of Greenville recently concluded and 
Pinckney's Treaty of San Lorenzo for peace in the southwestern Spanish borderlands in 
negotiation, George Washington engaged the Secretary of State, Edmund Randolph, in an 
affair of honor. Washington ambushed Randolph in an impromptu tribunal with 
accusations of treasonable corruption with revolutionary France, using apocryphal 
evidence fortuitously provided by Great Britain to Randolph's political enemies in 
Washington's cabinet. The implication of treasonous, un-patriotic activity stung 
Randolph, whom Washington had known since Randolph was a boy and who had 
faithfully served Washington both personally and professionally for twenty years. Deeply 
offended by the assault on his integrity and personal honor, Edmund Randolph 
immediately announced his resignation as Secretary of State and left office the following 
day, ending a lifetime of public service to the Revolution, Virginia, the Continental 
Congress, and the first presidential cabinet.4 Edmund Randolph abruptly became the first 
political victim of the founding generation at a critical juncture for the early republic. 
Edmund Randolph's abrupt resignation as Secretary of State implied to his 
political enemies that he was guilty of treasonable corruption with the French, without the 
benefit of a trial or even formal charges. The American memory has therefore 
marginalized Randolph's imbroglio as that of a corrupt public official caught in the act 
and dismissed in disgrace by Washington. But an analysis of the Randolph affair offers a 
valuable and much more complex insight into the early republic. Why did the British 
government provide their evidence implicating Randolph's corruption to George 
Washington's cabinet in the summer of 1795? What did Great Britain hope to gain? Was 
4
 Randolph, A Vindication of Mr. Randolph's Resignation, 1795, 5-8. 
3 
it as simple as an attempt to compel Washington to ratify Jay's Treaty over Randolph's 
objections, or is that a myth perpetuated by two centuries of inaccurate historiography? 
Randolph's hastened departure from the cabinet may also explain why 
Washington was perceived as a Federalist himself after the Jay Treaty, forced from his 
preferred position above party faction. The Federalist members of Washington's cabinet 
were willing accomplices to the British scheme to remove Randolph, the only perceived 
Republican still in Washington's cabinet during a period of increasingly hostile political 
faction. As hard as Washington tried to remain "above the fray" between parties, 
Randolph's departure resulted in an all Federalist cabinet for the remainder of his 
administration with the attendant implication that Washington himself was a Federalist, 
rather than an isolated victim of political maneuvering. It is also possible to see the 
eighteenth century code of honor in American politics brilliantly displayed in the affair of 
honor initiated by George Washington at Randolph's interview. 
The sequence of events leading up to that fateful moment was set in motion at 
least as early as October of 1794 when Secretary of State Randolph's conversations with 
the French minister to the United States, Joseph Fauchet, were reported to the French 
government by Fauchet via diplomatic dispatch.5 Fatefully, with England and France at 
war, the ship carrying the diplomatic pouch to France was intercepted by British cruisers 
in the Atlantic in March, 1795, and the captured dispatches were taken to London.6 
5
 Randolph, Vindication, 5-7; Conway, Omitted Chapters of History Disclosed in the Life and papers of 
Edmund Randolph, Governor of Virginia; First Attorney General of the United States, Secretary of State, 
286-288; Reardon, Edmund Randolph, 306-312. 
6
 The French corvette Jean Bart was intercepted by the British man of war Cerberus on 28 March 1795 off 
Pesmarque according to Conway, Omitted Chapters, 270, and James Thomas Flexner, Anguish and 
Farewell, 224. John C. Miller, The Federalist Era, 169, claimed that it was the British H.M.S. Africa that 
searched the American Sloop Peggy in U.S. coastal waters and recovered the diplomatic pouch. 
4 
The captured French dispatches were forwarded in May, 1795, to George 
Hammond, the British minister to the United States, who received them in July just as the 
public response to Jay's Treaty was reaching a crescendo. In July 1795, Edmund 
Randolph was the only cabinet member who advised George Washington not to sign 
Jay's Treaty until the British government stopped seizing American shipping bound for 
revolutionary France under a renewed "provision order." Therefore the receipt of 
sensitive material which might embarrass Randolph, or help to "get him out of the way" 
was welcome and timely news for Great Britain. 
On 28 July 1795 George Hammond turned over the original French document to 
the Secretary of the Treasury, Oliver Wolcott, who immediately shared the news with 
fellow Federalist, Secretary of War Timothy Pickering. Together Wolcott and Pickering 
shared the dispatch with Attorney General William Bradford, leaving Randolph the only 
cabinet member unaware of the potentially incriminating communication.8 
The original French document, Dispatch no. 10, was translated by Timothy 
Pickering who was not fluent in French and relied upon the aid of a dictionary. 
Pickering's transcription appeared to imply that Edmund Randolph had solicited money 
from the French government in exchange for information and influence within the cabinet 
during the Whiskey Rebellion the previous year. Dated 31 October 1794, while the 
militia was still on the march in western Pennsylvania to quell the Whiskey Rebellion, 
7
 Tachau, "George Washington and the Reputation of Edmund Randolph," 24. 
8
 Combs, The Jay Treaty, 167; Brant, "Edmund Randolph, Not Guilty!" 180; Conway, Omitted Chapters of 
History, 270. 
5 
the dispatch primarily focused on the "insurrection in the western counties," and the 
federal government's response. 
During the furtive communications between the British Foreign Ministry and the 
balance of the president's cabinet, George Washington was at his home at Mt. Vernon. 
Washington returned to Philadelphia 11 August 1795 and dined with the secretary of 
state in the president's quarters. During dinner Timothy Pickering called upon the 
president privately to tell Washington that he thought Randolph was a traitor. Pickering 
briefly described the contents of Fauchet's letter and Wolcott supplied the president with 
the original document along with Pickering's translation later that evening.10 
Washington met with his cabinet as planned the next morning, 12 August 1795. 
Washington did not mention the French dispatch at all, but "unexpectedly asked his 
advisors for comments on the advisability of immediate approval of the treaty," 
apparently reversing his previously stated position that he would not sign the treaty 
during the existence of the British provision order.11 After a brief discussion, Washington 
shocked the cabinet by announcing that he would sign Jay's Treaty immediately and 
instructed Edmund Randolph to prepare the treaty for exchange along with a memorial to 
the British government stating displeasure with the provision order, but not demanding its 
removal. 
The next six days were occupied with the administrative details of re-writing the 
memorial to be delivered to George Hammond before his impending departure for 
9
 Brant, "Not Guilty!" 183, 193; A complete translation of Dispatch no. 10 by Randolph is available in 
Reardon, Randolph, 371-380, as well as in Randolph, Vindication, 41-48. The French original can be found 
in Conway, Omitted Chapters, 272-281. 
10
 Flexner, George Washington: Anguish and Farewell, 224; Freeman (Carroll and Ashworth), George 
Washington: First in Peace, 280. 
" Reardon, Randolph, 308. 
12
 Freeman (Carroll and Ashworth), First in Peace, 286. 
6 
London. On 18 August 1795, George Washington signed Jay's Treaty exactly as 
recommended by the Senate. Washington then called a cabinet meeting for the following 
morning at nine o'clock and set in motion the ambush of Secretary of State Randolph. 
On the morning of 19 August 1795, the president sent a messenger to the 
Secretary of State to inform him that the cabinet meeting had been postponed until half 
past ten. Upon his arrival at the president's office at the appointed hour Randolph noticed 
that Secretaries Wolcott and Pickering were already in a meeting with Washington and it 
did not take long for Randolph to recognize the impromptu tribunal. The president 
quickly came to the point and handed Randolph the original Dispatch no. 10, fifteen large 
pages in Fauchet's handwriting in French. Washington asked Randolph to read it and 
"make such explanations as you choose." 
Randolph read Dispatch no. 10 with only a few comments. The dispatch referred 
to conversations Randolph had with Fauchet during the previous summer concerning the 
Whiskey Rebellion, and therefore his recollection was not very reassuring. After 
Randolph's brief and awkward comments, President Washington asked Wolcott and 
Pickering if they had any questions, an action which confirmed to Randolph the tribunal 
nature of this interview. Washington then asked Randolph to step out of the room for a 
moment while he conferred (deliberated) with the other cabinet (jury) members.14 
While Randolph was sequestered he reflected upon the surprising scenario. 
Randolph was convinced that he had already lost the trust and confidence of his lifelong 
mentor. Insulted by the accusation of wrongdoing, humiliated in front of social peers and 
subjected to questioning by lower cabinet members, Randolph became outraged. 
13
 Randolph, Vindication, 5, 6. Randolph conducted all of his correspondence with Fauchet in French and 
would have recognized Fauchet's handwriting, immediately identifying the dispatch as genuine. 
14
 Randolph, Vindication, 7. 
7 
Randolph's personal honor and integrity had been openly questioned, as well as his 
fidelity to the United States. After forty-five minutes, Washington called Randolph back 
into the room and asked him to make a written explanation of the contents of Dispatch 
no. 10. Randolph replied that he would comply with the president's request, but would 
find it difficult without the contents of Dispatches no. 3 and no. 6, which were referred to 
in Dispatch No. 10, but not made available at this inquiry.15 Randolph also announced 
that he "would not continue in the office [of Secretary of State] one second after such 
treatment." Randolph proceeded directly to the State Department where he ordered all of 
the offices locked and handed the keys to the chief clerk.16 George Washington had the 
resignation of his family friend and loyal servant of twenty years before noon the next 
day, unceremoniously ending the public service of a distinguished founding father. 
Edmund Randolph devoted the next four months to clearing his name and 
reputation. Randolph proceeded just as one would expect from a successful lawyer; he set 
out to collect evidence and built a case for his defense. Randolph immediately sought out 
Joseph Fauchet as he prepared to return to France and asked for a written affidavit 
clarifying the contents of the dispatches and disabusing the notion that Randolph had 
acted improperly. Fauchet and his successor, Peter Adet, each cooperated with Randolph 
and provided him with sound endorsements as well as the pertinent abstracts of the 
missing dispatches no. 3 and no. 6. George Washington made every piece of 
correspondence between the two men, both private and official, available to Randolph 
Combs, "The Randolph Affair," in The Jay Treaty, 193-196. Combs introduced new evidence that 
proved- dispatches no. 3 and no. 6 were not available to the British government or Washington's cabinet in 
1795, belying previous suspicions that they had been withheld intentionally to cloud Randolph's case. 
16
 Randolph, Vindication, 8; Freeman (Carroll and Ashworth), First in Peace, 296. 
8 
1 7 
and gave him permission to publish anything that might prove helpful, which he did. 
The product of Randolph's labor was a one-hundred and five page pamphlet entitled, A 
Vindication of Mr. Randolph's Resignation, released to the public in December 1795. 
The contents of Dispatch no. 10 itself had been withheld from the public under 
Washington's injunction at Randolph's request while Randolph assembled his pamphlet. 
Therefore it was not until December of 1795 that Dispatch no. 10 appeared in print in its 
entirety in Randolph's Vindication. Fauchet's October, 1794, dispatch had been written to 
inform the new, post Jacobin government of France of the current state of affairs in the 
United States. Maximilien Robespierre, Fauchet's political sponsor, had recently met the 
guillotine as power once again shifted in revolutionary France. Fauchet's lengthy 
dispatch was therefore likely meant to be more than simply informative; it was an effort 
to impress his new masters and secure his own uncertain future. 
Fauchet's dispatch was dedicated to the Whiskey Rebellion; "the insurrection of 
the western counties and the repressive means adopted by the government," as well as the 
widening partisan chasm in American politics during his tenure 1793-1794. The opening 
paragraph of Dispatch no. 10 credited Edmund Randolph as an honest, reliable source of 
information as Fauchet observed that "the precious confessions of Mr. Randolph alone 
throw a satisfactory light upon everything that comes to pass." Fauchet recognized that 
17
 George Washington to Edmund Randolph, Philadelphia, 21 October 1795, in Randolph Vindication, 25. 
18 
Several historians have observed Fauchet's precarious political position. For example, Tachau noted that 
Fauchet, a political appointee of revolutionary France's Jacobin government had arrived in Philadelphia in 
1794 with an arrest warrant for his Girondist predecessor, Citizen Genet. Genet's return to France would 
have almost certainly assured him the same fate at the guillotine as his Girondist compatriots, and was 
provided political asylum by George Washington. Fauchet's Jacobin party met the guillotine during the 
summer of 1794, which made Fauchet's future with regard to his native land, and its newest government 
under the Directory, uncertain. Palmer, The Age of Democratic Revolution: A Political History of Europe 
and America, 1760-1800. Vol. 2, The Struggle, 110-129; Tachau, "Washington and Randolph," 18; 
Flexner, Anguish and Farewell, 128. 
9 
the "crisis" which faced the federal government in 1794 over the insurrection was not 
simply a "question of the excise," but a more complex manifestation of party politics. 
Fauchet then provided his government with a detailed description of the "federalists and 
anti-federalists" as he attempted to explain their ideological and political differences. 
Fauchet was particularly harsh in his description of Alexander Hamilton as a 
"stockjobber," and "monarchist," as he railed against Hamilton's system of finance, 
which he claimed required "immoral and impolitic means of taxation," that had become 
"the principal complaint of the western people."19 
Fauchet's Dispatch no. 10 correctly identified Spain's closure of the Mississippi 
to American navigation after the treaties of 1783 as a perpetual source of western 
discontent with the eastern government. Fauchet also noted the complexity of westward 
settlement and the need for a government presence in the western territories to regulate 
and legitimize land sales. Dispatch no. 10 claimed that throughout 1793 and 1794 the 
"decrepit state of affairs" between the needs of the western people and the actions of the 
eastern government "could not but presage either a revolution or a civil war."20 
Dispatch no. 10 referred to a previous Dispatch no. 3 that documented an earlier 
conversation with the Secretary of State about the implementation of "coercive 
measures," to collect the excise tax. Fauchet believed that the federal government, at 
Hamilton's direction, may have intentionally provoked the rebellion to provide an excuse 
for introducing harsh laws and further subordinating the states to federal power. As 
evidence of his theory Fauchet quoted Randolph as having told him that, "under the 
pretext of giving energy to the government, [Hamilton's plan] was intended to introduce 
19
 Joseph Fauchet, Dispatch no. 10 to the Commissioner of Foreign Relations [France], Philadelphia, 
31 October 1794, in Randolph, Vindication, 41-48. Hereafter referred to as Fauchet, Dispatch no. 10. 
20
 Fauchet, Dispatch no. 10, para. 10-13. 
10 
absolute power and to mislead the President in paths that would lead him to 
unpopularity." Fauchet blamed Hamilton for the raising of an army to suppress the 
citizens of the United States, while he noted that the more peaceful tactic of first sending 
commissioners to assess the situation was clearly "due to the influence of Mr. Randolph 
over the mind of the President."21 
The most damaging paragraph in Dispatch no. 10 for Edmund Randolph came 
when Fauchet stated that on 5 August 1794, as the cabinet debated the use of force to 
quell the rebellion, "Mr. Randolph came to see me with an air of great eagerness, and 
made overtures of which I have given you an account in my No. 6. Thus with some 
thousands of dollars the [French] Republic could have decided upon civil war or peace! 
Thus the consciences of the pretended patriots of America have already their price." 
Without further explanation of the "overtures" of Dispatch no. 6 the implication of this 
passage to Randolph's enemies was that Randolph "had a price" and had solicited money 
from Fauchet for his "influence over the mind of the President."22 
Randolph published Dispatch no. 6 in his Vindication along with Fauchet's 
explanation of the "overtures," referred to in no. 10. In the summer of 1794 Randolph 
suspected a British subterfuge to foment the rebellion in the Western Counties, just as 
they were supporting and arming the Native Americans in the Old Northwest prior to the 
Battle of Fallen Timbers in late August. Randolph strongly believed that if British 
involvement with the Whiskey Rebellion could be definitively proven, just as their 
support of the Native Americans had been proven in the spring, support for the Whiskey 
Rebellion would diminish in a similar wave of resentment and anti-British sentiment 
21
 Ibid., para 14, 15. 
22
 Fauchet, Dispatch no. 10, para. 16. 
11 
obviating the need for federal force and what Randolph perceived as the threat of civil 
war. Randolph apparently had a lead on actionable intelligence of British involvement 
and sought Fauchet's assistance in obtaining it. 
Dispatch no. 6 described four flour merchants who Randolph thought could 
provide the evidence he needed, but feared financial reprisal or debtor's prison from 
British merchants to whom they ran in debt. Randolph sought Fauchet's assistance as a 
purchasing agent of the French government to relieve the flour merchants' debt to the 
British by advancing them funds on existing flour contracts with France. An advance of 
funds under existing contracts would have been less conspicuous than relief overtly 
provided by the U.S. government to purchase information, and as the funds were merely 
an advance for goods already purchased, they could not be characterized as a bribe. 
Fauchet explained that he was unable to provide the funds simply because he did not 
have them, but was disappointed to think that American citizens would have to be paid 
for helping their country avoid civil war, which led him to conclude that "with some 
thousands of dollars" advanced to the potential informants, "the [French] Republic could 
have decided upon civil war or peace," if they could have afforded it, and that the 
"consciences of the pretended patriots of America have already their price."24 The flour 
merchants were never named, but apparently Fauchet was correct; without financial 
assistance they did not provide Randolph with the evidence he sought to prove British 
involvement with the Whiskey Rebellion. 
Fauchet, Dispatch no. 6, in Randolph, Vindication, 18, hereafter referred to as Fauchet, Dispatch no. 6; 
Randolph, Vindication, 82-88. 
24
 Fauchet "Certificate" in Randolph, Vindication, 15, 16; Fauchet, Dispatch no. 6. 
25
 Brandt, "Edmund Randolph, Not Guilty!" offers the most detailed account of the flour merchant scheme. 
12 
The remainder of Dispatch no. 10 painted a rather dismal picture of a disorderly 
militia unwillingly called into action to suppress fellow citizens. Fauchet noted the 
impropriety in the symbolism of the Secretary of Treasury marching at the head of the 
militia, "intimidating his enemies with force," a popular contemporary opinion as well as 
that of modern historians. Fauchet also echoed another popular suspicion that the debt 
incurred to raise the militia was another scheme of Hamilton's for subjugating the states 
to the federal government and enforcing his finance system.26 
Dispatch no. 10 alone did not offer any specifics about how "some thousands of 
dollars," would have been used to influence civil war or peace. There was no mention of 
who asked for any money, who received any money, or how the funds would be used, 
and certainly no mention that Randolph had personally asked for money from the French 
Republic. The lack of substance did not prevent Randolph's political enemies from 
alleging that Randolph may have asked for a bribe in exchange for state secrets or 
Randolph's "influence over the mind of the President." The implication that Edmund 
Randolph had sold his influence as the Secretary of State to a foreign government would 
not have met the new constitution's narrow definition of treason, but if true would have 
97 
qualified as "treasonable corruption." Randolph never faced formal charges of 
treasonous activity and returned to practicing law in Virginia until he passed away in 
98 
relative obscurity in 1813. 
The historiography of Edmund Randolph's imbroglio has shaped the American 
memory of Randolph and has kept him on the margins of the American past. The 
historiography begins with Randolph's own Vindication in December 1795. Although it 
26
 Fachet, Dispatch no. 10, para. 19-23. 
27
 Brant, "Not Guilty,"180. 
28
 Reardon, Edmund Randolph, 359-365. 
13 
was poorly received at the time, it remains a wealth of documentary evidence and a 
narrative description of the events of 19 August 1795. Later accounts have provided 
embellished versions of the events and several writers have critiqued Randolph's 
arguments, though it is notable that no author has ever refuted Randolph's facts. Even 
George Washington, though publicly embarrassed by the pamphlet, never disputed the 
accuracy of its contents.29 
Randolph's Vindication was immediately answered by the famous federalist pen 
of Peter Porcupine, who delivered his "New Year's Gift to the Democrats; or, 
Observations on a Pamphlet Entitled, 'A Vindication of Mr. Randolph's Resignation.'"30 
Peter Porcupine dissected Vindication page by page, concluding that Randolph must 
have been guilty or he would not have gone to such extremes to prove his innocence. 
Randolph responded with an anonymous publication of "Political Truths"31 to amplify his 
Vindication and answer Peter Porcupine, but the entire volley of words was buried by the 
more pressing national debate over Jay's Treaty which dominated national politics in 
early 1796 as it headed to the House of Representatives for funding. 
Edmund Randolph's significant contributions to the independence of the United 
States and the creation of the early republic were swept into obscurity and nearly written 
out of history from the start. Randolph's severed relations with Washington assured his 
fate as an outcast throughout the remainder of the Federalist Era and his Federalist 
antagonists were eager to keep Randolph out of the picture. Early nineteenth-century 
29
 Conway, Omitted Chapters, 347. 
30
 Peter Porcupine [William Cobbett], "A New Year's Gift to the Democrats; or, Observations on a 
Pamphlet Entitled, 'A Vindication of Mr. Randolph's Resignation.'" 
31 
[Edmund Randolph], "Political Truth: or, Animadversions on the Present State of Public Affairs; With 
an Inquiry into the Truth of the Charges Preferred Against Mr. Randolph." 
14 
Federalist biographers and historians perpetuated the assumption of Randolph's guilt, and 
according to Irving Brandt, "once he had been found guilty, his federalist accusers had to 
keep him so." Brandt cited biographies of Wolcott, Pickering and Hamilton, each written 
by family members or descendants in the mid 1800's, that convicted Randolph and went 
out of their way to prove it based largely on the recollections of Randolph's political 
enemies. Only Randolph's grandson, Peter V. Daniel Jr., defended his memory in 1855 
with a reproduction of A Vindication of Mr. Randolph's Resignation under a new title; A 
Vindication of Edmund Randolph. The subtle change in the title shifted the emphasis 
from a vindication of Randolph's resignation to a vindication of the man. Daniel noted 
that because Randolph passed away as an outcast with little means, his personal papers 
and correspondence had not been preserved for future generations, frustrating any 
historian attempting to recreate Randolph's story. 
Randolph's biographers have generally defended Randolph. In 1888, Moncure 
Daniel Conway incorporated volumes of written documentation to portray what was until 
then an almost untold story; Omitted Chapters of History Disclosed in the Life and 
Papers of Edmund Randolph, Governor of Virginia; First Attorney General of the United 
States, Secretary of State. Conway used the few remaining papers of Randolph with those 
of his more famous and therefore better preserved friends and colleagues to highlight 
Randolph's contributions to Virginia and the United States. Conway argued strenuously 
for Randolph's innocence and believed that Washington knew it, yet Omitted Chapters 
remains a wealth of objective documentary evidence, and was the only positive original 
work written about Randolph in the nineteenth-century.33 Edmund Randolph's 
32
 Brandt, "Not Guilty," 189; Peter V. Daniel Jr., ed., A Vindication of Edmund Randolph, vii. 
33
 Conway, Omitted Chapters; Worthington Chauncey Ford, The Writings of Washington. 
15 
diminished place in the American memory merited only one biographer in the twentieth-
century. John J. Reardon, Edmund Randolph: A Biography, humanized Randolph for the 
first time and portrayed him as a patriot, a prominent attorney, a successful politician, a 
loyal servant to George Washington, and above all a man of integrity. As with Conway, 
Reardon concluded that Edmund Randolph could not have been guilty of treasonous 
corruption with the French minister and was the victim of political forces. Randolph's 
Vindication combined with his life story becomes a convincing argument for Randolph's 
innocence. 
The history of Jay's Treaty is forever intertwined with the fate of Edmund 
Randolph because Dispatch No. 10 was produced by the British Government just as Jay's 
Treaty lay upon Washington's desk for signature, seemingly meant to discredit the only 
cabinet member who advised against ratification in July of 1795. Yet Samuel Flagg 
Bemis' progressive era work, Jay's Treaty: A Study in Commerce and Diplomacy, which 
stood as the definitive standard on Jay's Treaty for the first half of the twentieth-century, 
focused entirely on the more famous, and therefore better documented, Secretary of 
Treasury Alexander Hamilton, as though he had been the Secretary of State. Bemis chose 
to completely discount the involvement of Secretary of State Randolph in the negotiation 
of Jay's Treaty and further removed Randolph from the American past. 
Jerald A. Combs, The Jay Treaty: Political Battleground of the Founding Fathers, 
similarly dismissed Secretary of State Randolph's contributions to international treaty 
negotiations while focusing on Hamilton, doing further disservice to Randolph's role in 
the early republic. Todd Estes 2006 political history of The Jay Treaty Debate, Public 
Opinion and the Evolution of Early American Political Culture, quite reasonably stated 
16 
that the "Randolph affair would not be addressed as it has its own historians," and went 
on to discuss Federalist Era Politics as though Edmund Randolph did not exist. Estes' 
intentional omission of Edmund Randolph from a recent history of the early republic 
epitomizes the trend of dismissing Edmund Randolph from the American memory. 
Randolph's forced resignation also belongs to the history of the Whiskey 
Rebellion because the contents of Fauchet's dispatches and Randolph's Vindication 
reveal Randolph's suspicions of British interference in the Western Counties and his 
attempts to obtain evidence to prove it. Yet Thomas P. Slaughter, The Whiskey Rebellion: 
Frontier Epilogue to the American Revolution, appropriately concluded with the return of 
the militia from the Western Counties of Pennsylvania in December 1794, long before 
Randolph's ambush. Slaughter only referred to Randolph's incident in his conclusion and 
repeated the suspicion of guilt, though offered no opinion of Randolph. William 
Hogeland, The Whiskey Rebellion: George Washington, Alexander Hamilton, and the 
Frontier Rebels who Challenged America's Newfound Sovereignty, nearly omitted 
Edmund Randolph entirely and made no mention of the affair. 
Washington's biographers have tended to marginalize Randolph. John Alexander 
Carroll and Mary Wells Ashworth completed Douglas Southall Freeman's extensive 
biography of Washington in 1957 with the final volume, First in Peace. Although Carroll 
and Ashworth acknowledged that previous evidence suggested Randolph was probably 
not guilty of any corruption, they concluded that Washington himself was convinced 
from the interview of 19 August that Randolph was in fact guilty, continuing the trend to 
reinforce Randolph's guilt. James Thomas Flexner built upon the work of Freeman, 
Carroll and Ashworth in 1969 with his four volume biography of George Washington. 
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The final volume, George Washington: Anguish and Farewell, 1793-1799, portrayed 
Randolph as a minor character in Washington's administration and similarly concluded 
that Washington personally judged Randolph as guilty, although Flexner acknowledged 
the scholarship of Conway and Irving Brandt which suggested his innocence.35 
Irving Brandt offered the first twentieth-century defense of Edmund Randolph in 
1950 with "Edmund Randolph, Not Guilty!" Brandt closely examined the evidence 
against Randolph and concluded that besides the malevolence of Wolcott and Pickering, 
Randolph was also a victim of poor translations of the original materials. Brandt faulted 
Pickering's amateur translation of no. 10 with the aid of a dictionary, but noted that 
Randolph had also used a flawed translation provided by George Taylor, the chief clerk 
of the State Department, in his own Vindication despite his ability to have translated the 
document himself.36 Brandt's explanation of the three dispatches, combined with other 
contemporary evidence, produced a narrative of Randolph's attempts to use the French 
minister to leverage information from the Pennsylvania flour merchants about subversive 
British involvement with the 1794 insurrections in the Western Counties leading up to the 
Whiskey Rebellion. 
Mary K. Bonsteel Tachau, "George Washington and the Reputation of Edmund 
Randolph," was the only other twentieth-century defense of Edmund Randolph. Tachau 
acknowledged Brandt's earlier defense based upon translation errors, but made her 
35
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argument based upon the contents of Dispatch no. 10 and claimed that Washington's 
actual fault with Randolph was not over the fact that he had communicated with Fauchet, 
but that the details of Dispatch no. 10 portrayed his administration in such a poor light 
regarding the handling of the Whiskey Rebellion and the increasing hostility of American 
partisan politics. Even though Tachau believed that Randolph was innocent of all 
allegations except poor judgment, she believed that Randolph's downfall was his 
publication of Vindication, which was such a "harmful diatribe lashing out against 
Washington," that "Washington was left no room to forgive or rehabilitate Randolph's 
reputation even if Washington had believed he was innocent." 
The trajectory of this historiography over time has increasingly introduced factual 
information suggesting or proving Edmund Randolph's innocence. Yet even as historians 
have increasingly acknowledged Randolph's innocence, Randolph's role in the early 
republic continues to be marginalized to the point of omission. Two-hundred years after 
the fact we can now analyze the volumes of documentation and interpretations of this 
event without the partisan bias with which it began. It is now possible to synthesize the 
work done by researchers in various aspects of the Federalist Era and address Randolph's 
resignation as more than an embarrassing side-bar or footnote to history. 
Placing the Randolph affair in context with the events of the Early Republic 
reveals that Edmund Randolph was not the only victim of this tragic episode. The British 
Foreign Office identified Edmund Randolph as an impediment to British activities in 
North America after the Battle of Fallen Timbers in 1794, and formulated a plan to 
remove the Secretary of State from office almost a year prior to his ambush and 
resignation. Regardless of Randolph's guilt or innocence with respect to the contents of 
37
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Dispatch no. 10, a foreign government formulated and successfully executed a plan to 
remove a cabinet level official from office. The composition of the United States 
government was manipulated by a foreign power attempting to advance its own agenda in 
North America. 
Great Britain's actual goal to remove Randolph from office has been obscured 
because the weapon the British Foreign Office used to expel Randolph from George 
Washington's cabinet has been widely misinterpreted. Edmund Randolph himself 
incorrectly assumed that the revelation of Dispatch no. 10 while Jay's Treaty awaited the 
president's signature was meant to compel Washington's ratification over Randolph's 
objections. Histories of the Federalist Era, Jay's Treaty, Washington's biographers and 
Randolph's defenders have repeated Randolph's own belief that Washington's 
"immediate ratification of Jay's Treaty was a direct result of Washington's receipt of 
T O 
Dispatch no. 10 and his sudden loss of faith in [Randolph]." These assumptions 
overlook Washington's own words and clearly stated intentions as well as the agenda of 
British Foreign Ministry. The president's decision to sign Jay's Treaty was a deliberate 
act which followed seven weeks of deliberation. The presentation of Dispatch no. 10 the 
night before Washington's planned announcement of his decision to sign Jay's Treaty 
was a coincidence of timing that gave the appearance of an "immediate decision," and 
created the illusion that these two distinctly separate events were related. The British 
revelation of Dispatch no. 10 was never intended to influence the ratification of Jay's 
Treaty and the presumption that it caused Washington to sign the treaty is a myth. 
Historians have frequently impressed modern conventions of professional public 
service upon the Randolph affair, which has led to an incorrect popular twentieth-century 
38
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assumption that Randolph left office in disgrace. The subtleties of honor were easily 
understood as a common language to the founding generation, but have been largely 
omitted from most histories of the early republic. Recent work in the eighteenth-century 
code of honor in American politics has enabled this study to place the events surrounding 
Edmund Randolph's political assassination into the framework of an affair of honor. 
Every action of George Washington and Edmund Randolph from the ambush at the 
cabinet meeting to Randolph's one-hundred and five page Vindication followed the ritual 
and language of the code of honor. It is now possible to demonstrate that George 
Washington, the President of the United States, was actively engaged in an affair of 
honor with his Secretary of State, for purely personal, yet un-selfish reasons. It is also 
now possible to show that Edmund Randolph's reputation was not devastated by his 
resignation and that his Vindication was actually quite successful, contrary to all existing 
accounts. 
Edmund Randolph appears to be the major casualty in the scheme to publicly 
humiliate him; however, Washington's biographers have also alluded to the personal loss 
Washington endured and the sense of betrayal he suffered. It is possible that George 
Washington was the biggest loser in the Randolph affair. A plan orchestrated by the 
British government and facilitated by political faction removed the last of Washington's 
trusted "family" of advisors from his service at a time when he could least afford it. After 
Randolph's resignation Washington struggled to fill several vacancies in the government 
as Jay's Treaty headed for a significant constitutional challenge amidst calls for 
Washington's own impeachment.39 Randolph would not likely have ever abandoned his 
idol in such a crisis, but his forced removal left Washington alone to face an increasingly 
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hostile and confusing political scene. When placed within the context of the events of the 
early republic, the political assassination of Edmund Randolph is much less about 
Edmund Randolph and more about foreign affairs, domestic politics, and the political 
isolation of George Washington. 
22 
Chapter I 
Edmund Randolph and the Wrath of the British Empire 
International diplomacy was not unknown to the founding generation. The very 
question of declaring independence in 1776 was itself tied to the need to attract foreign 
assistance for the conflict with Great Britain.1 However, during Washington's second 
administration the United States' less than twenty-years of experience in foreign affairs 
paled in comparison to the ancient histories of foreign intrigue studied and perfected by 
the imperial powers competing for the North American continent. Therefore it is not 
surprising that the British Foreign Ministry so easily formulated a plan to remove a 
cabinet official whom they considered an impediment to British foreign policy objectives 
and that the fledgling U.S. government was so easily manipulated. With Edmund 
Randolph's forced resignation the British government succeeded in dictating the 
composition of George Washington's presidential cabinet to suit their own objectives in 
North America. 
Edmund Randolph incurred the wrath of the British Empire shortly after he 
became Secretary of State, long before Dispatch no. 10 was even written. Randolph's 
diplomatic maneuvering with Great Britain during 1794, combined with General 
Anthony Wayne's military triumph at the Battle of Fallen Timbers in August, 1794, to 
shatter the British-Indian alliance in North America, just as John Jay and the British 
Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Lord Grenville, were negotiating the "Treaty of Amity, 
Commerce and Navigation" in London. Secretary of State Randolph's dynamic and firm 
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diplomacy in defense of American sovereignty supported by a credible U.S. military 
presence operating in the Ohio Valley to enforce the will of the federal government 
compelled Lord Grenville and the British Foreign Ministry to acknowledge the United 
States on the most equal terms since American independence. Frustrated by the Secretary 
of State's successful assertion of U.S. sovereignty as an equal state and the loss of control 
over the interior of the North American continent, Lord Grenville determined 
immediately after Jay's Treaty was signed in November, 1794, that because of 
Randolph's perceived anti-British behavior, he must be removed from a position of 
influence within the government. On 20 November 1794, the day after Jay's Treaty was 
signed, Lord Grenville specifically instructed George Hammond via diplomatic dispatch 
to "converse confidentially with those persons in America who are friends," to 
accomplish that goal.2 
Six months before the British government came into possession of Dispatch no. 
10 and nearly a year before Washington's ratification of Jay's Treaty was even in 
question, the outmaneuvered and frustrated British Foreign Ministry determined to find a 
way to get Edmund Randolph out of a position of influence. Dispatch no. 10 was simply 
a weapon of opportunity employed to accomplish that goal and the release of Dispatch 
no. 10 by the British Foreign Ministry to men known to be opposed to Randolph was 
undoubtedly meant to discredit or even ruin Edmund Randolph. However, George 
Hammond's receipt of the dispatch in July, 1795, during George Washington's 
deliberation over the ratification of Jay's Treaty was merely a fortuitous coincidence of 
timing which has led historians to incorrectly link the two events ever since. 
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The Definitive Treaty of Peace in 1783 did little for the United States other than 
acknowledge independence and separation from the British Empire. During the critical 
period between the peace of 1783, and the creation of the federal government in 1789, 
prospects for the union were so faltering and uncertain that the imperial powers of Europe 
with claims in North America saw the inchoate republic as weak and potentially easy 
prey. Although the union was strengthened by Washington's leadership and the new 
federal government, imperial Atlantic powers did not cease in their attempts to expand 
their own claims in North America or to break up the union in hopes of ceding new 
territory.3 
Key components of the British plans for North America were seven forts in U.S. 
territory, according to the Definitive Treaty of Peace of 1783, that were occupied by the 
British military at the end of the Revolutionary War but not surrendered. Their strategic 
locations along the St. Lawrence River, Lake Champlain and the choke points between 
the Great Lakes made them invaluable to controlling navigation between the Atlantic 
Ocean and the interior of North America (see figure 1.1). 
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Figure 1.1 The Posts of the Old Northwest. 
Courtesy of the University of Texas Libraries, The University of Texas at Austin 
http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/historical/n frontier 1783-1812.jpg 
Forts Point-au-Fer and Dutchman's Point (not depicted) on Lake Champlain, NY. 
Fort Oswegatchie at present day Ogdensburg, NY. 
Fort Ontario in Oswego, NY. (also known as Ft. George) 
Fort Niagara at the northeast entrance to the Niagara River, NY. 
Fort Detroit along the west bank of the Detroit River at present day Detroit, MI. 
Fort Miamis on the Maumee River in Toledo was manned in 1794-1796 and was not one 
of the forts garrisoned at the end of the Revolutionary War. 
Michilimacinac on Mackinac Island on northern Lake Michigan. 
The traditional term "Posts of the Old Northwest" is a misnomer, as only Forts Detroit 
and Michilimacinac lie northwest of the Ohio River. Five of the original eight forts were 
in well established territory defined as New York.4 
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As early as April, 1784, the British Secretary for Home Affairs, Lord Sydney, formally 
established Great Britain's policy of continued occupation when he informed the 
Governor General of Canada that "there was no need to evacuate the posts," citing U.S. 
non-compliance with the treaty of 1783, specifically unsettled pre-war debts and the 
treatment of loyalists as his rationale.5 The continued British occupation of military forts 
within U.S. territory long after the Revolutionary War was evidence to some that "the 
war did not end at Yorktown."6 
Great Britain operated the posts of the Old Northwest without any change in the 
status quo throughout the critical period between independence and the implementation 
of the federal government. The occupied forts quickly became international pawns during 
George Washington's first year as president when Spain seized three English ships in 
Nootka Sound on the northwest coast of North America during the summer of 1789. The 
clash between Spain and England sparked diplomatic tension which threatened war in 
Europe as imperial powers competed for control of the west coast of North America.7 In 
1790, Spain appealed to France, its traditional ally, for support in its claim. Great Britain 
was wary of a Franco-Iberian alliance which may have found support from the United 
States, as France was the only Atlantic nation with a diplomatic relationship to the United 
States in 1790, and still maintained the Treaty of Alliance of 1778. Great Britain 
therefore contemplated surrendering its contentious posts in United States' territory to 
secure U.S. neutrality. 
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France was unable to offer any assistance to Spain as it was consumed with 
increasing internal tension and its own revolution. Spain, unable to secure French 
support, was forced to back away from its claim over Nootka Sound in July, 1790, 
removing the threat of war along with any incentive for Great Britain to give up their 
forts in U.S. territory in 1790.9 The Nootka Sound controversy set an important precedent 
for the Atlantic balance of power in North America. Great Britain had considered 
appeasing the United States to preclude a possible alliance with Spain or from exercising 
its existing alliance with France, an acknowledgement of the United States' strategic 
location directly between Spanish Louisiana and British Canada. 
Lord Hawkesbury and the British Committee of Trade established a policy in 
1790 that stated "only Great Britain should have the right to navigate the St. Lawrence or 
the Great Lakes." Great Britain recognized the value of an economic dependence on 
British products which could be created in the interior of the continent by controlling the 
major inland waterways of the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers.10 Samuel Flagg Bemis' 
economic study of Jay's Treaty revealed the British master plan to continue to foster their 
alliance with the Indians of the Old Northwest and eventually create an "Indian Country" 
situated between the Ohio River and the Canadian border that would serve as a buffer 
between the rapidly expanding United States and potential British control of the interior 
of the continent.11 When Great Britain finally established diplomatic relations with the 
United States in 1791, Lord Grenville and the Foreign Ministry endorsed Lord 
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Hawkesbury's instructions to George Hammond to champion British economic plans for 
North America. 
Historians of the Whiskey Rebellion, such as Thomas P. Slaughter, have focused 
on alternative schemes of containment by focusing on British and Spanish attempts to 
draw settlers west of the Appalachians into their empires though secession from the 
eastern states or by fomenting civil war.13 The cooperation of the Indian nations and the 
British-Indian alliance was equally important to both of these plans. Frontier harassment 
of settlers and the denial of navigation on the Mississippi and the Ohio Rivers fostered 
disaffection west of the Appalachians with an eastern government that was unable or 
unwilling to offer protection or meet the needs of its citizens.14 Maintaining control of the 
posts of the Old Northwest was essential to establishing British hegemony in North 
America and containing the United States east of the Appalachians, or at least southeast 
of the Ohio River Valley. A strong British-Indian alliance provided a surrogate military 
force multiplier for Great Britain, which was vital for the protection of the posts and 
therefore the control of the interior of the continent. 
George Washington and the founding generation may not have known the extent 
of Great Britain's plans to continue to expand its control within North America, but they 
were well aware of the British-Indian alliance and the implications of British interference 
with the Indian nations on the western frontier. Ironically, Washington began his military 
career in 1753 by scouting in the Ohio Valley and reporting incursions of the French 
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from the north into territory claimed by the British crown.15 At the conclusion of the 
Seven Years' War the founding generation witnessed as the British supplanted the French 
in Canada and assumed their alliance with the Indian nations. 
Only a decade later, Washington, Knox, Hamilton and the Continental Army 
fought the resultant British-Indian alliance along the northwest border during the 
Revolutionary War.16 The Old Northwest was still Virginia territory during the 
Revolutionary War; therefore its defense had been the responsibility of Governor Thomas 
Jefferson (1779-1781), whose attorney general was Edmund Randolph (1776-1786). 
Randolph later served as governor of Virginia (1786-1788) and supervised the cession of 
the Old Northwest from the Virginia Charter to the new United States under the 
Northwest Ordnance. All of Washington's original cabinet members had extensive 
personal experience with the Old Northwest and were intimately familiar with the 
deleterious impact of the British-Indian alliance along the frontier as well as the 
significance of the occupied British forts within U.S. territory. 
Upon entering office President Washington and Secretary of War Henry Knox 
immediately made it a priority to suppress the Indian resistance to westward expansion 
and to break the British-Indian alliance within U.S. territory. Washington and Knox's 
earliest efforts in the Old Northwest were failures. Brigadier General Josiah Harmar's 
campaign of 1790 ended after only one engagement with Harmar's entire small 
undisciplined force scattered and disbanded. Major General Arthur St. Clair's expedition 
of 1791 was hastily assembled and just as poorly trained as Harmar's troops. On 4 
November 1791, St. Clair's expedition was attacked along the banks of the Wabash River 
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less than one-hundred miles north of the Ohio River and completely routed with a 
tremendous loss of life.17 
Each successive defeat of U.S. arms further strengthened the British-Indian 
alliance and emboldened Indian resolve in the Old Northwest, placing western settlers in 
increasing danger while intensifying the pressure on the eastern government to protect its 
citizens. In the spring of 1792 George Washington called upon Major General Anthony 
Wayne to quell the Indians of the Old Northwest and "bring them to peace," as he 
petitioned congress to establish and fund a federal army. In December, 1792, the United 
States' congress established the Legion of the United States, the first standing army of the 
early republic. Unlike previous expeditions, General Wayne spent nearly a year 
assembling men and supplies while vigorously training in Indian tactics and guerilla 
warfare on the Ohio River just south of Pittsburgh. In the spring of 1793Wayne's well 
prepared legion resolutely started down the Ohio River with a force of over 2,000 
regulars.20 
Until the summer of 1793 the power of the Indian Confederacy and the inability 
of the United States to mount a credible campaign to deter it also emboldened Great 
Britain's plans for the interior of North America. Lord Grenville and the British Foreign 
Ministry were encouraged by the news of St. Clair's disastrous defeat and believed that 
the Americans would be more inclined to accept British negotiations for their proposed 
barrier state in the Old Northwest. Grenville therefore instructed George Hammond to 
17
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continue to press the United States to allow Great Britain to mediate a peace with the 
Native Americans, a proposal that Washington and his entire cabinet rejected. Jerald 
Combs concluded that by 1793, "as long as the power of the Indian Confederacy and the 
weakness of the United States gave England hopes of erecting a trade empire in the West 
based upon a trade monopoly of the Mississippi-Great Lakes-St. Lawrence system, the 
9 1 
United States could offer nothing that would deter British confrontation." 
British Officials in Canada strove to achieve the economic and foreign policy 
goals established by Great Britain and by 1793 were taking increasingly bold measures. 
Lieutenant Governor Simcoe, the British Governor of Upper Canada, had the temerity to 
send a military detachment to Sodus Bay, New York, to warn off U.S. settlers who were 
99 
"infringing upon the King's rights in 'Indian Territory.'" Simcoe's coercion would have 
been thoroughly intimidating to American settlers as Sodus Bay was situated along the 
south shore of Lake Ontario between two British garrisons in U.S. territory: Fort Ontario 
(Oswego, New York) just thirty miles east and the armed British fort at Niagara one 
hundred miles to the west. During 1793 Lieutenant Governor Simcoe, along with the Six 
Nations of Iroquois, protested the U.S. settlement of Presque Isle (Erie, Pennsylvania) on 
the south shore of Lake Erie. Lord Dorchester, the British Governor General of Canada, 
sanctioned Simcoe's efforts to discourage U.S. settlers from the south shores of the Great 
Lakes in what the British government still hoped would be contested territory. 
The French Revolution and war in Europe dramatically changed the balance of 
power in the Atlantic world. England and Spain had threatened to go to war only three 
21
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years earlier over Nootka Sound, yet in 1793 they were suddenly allied in a war with a 
common enemy against Revolutionary France. As with Nootka Sound, U.S. allegiance 
was critical to each of the warring Atlantic powers. Yet because of the exigencies of the 
war in Europe, and the commitment of the U.S. government to fielding a credible military 
force, by 1794 The Legion of the United States outmanned and out gunned the complete 
military compliment available to either British Canada or Spanish Florida and Louisiana, 
which dictated a rising American dominance in the balance of power in North America.24 
Wayne's well trained, properly supplied and strictly disciplined legion marching 
in the Ohio Valley threatened the British posts of the Old Northwest as well as the 
British-Indian alliance. Lieutenant Governor Simcoe acknowledged the gross under-
manning of the British garrisons in Canada and the poor state of repair of most of the 
facilities in 1793 when he reported that "any post on the continent, if attacked, must be 
considered as necessarily sacrificed."25 Lieutenant Governor Simcoe therefore initiated 
correspondence with his new Spanish allies in North America and proposed a British-
Iberian alliance to "separate frontiersman west of the Appalachians from the eastern 
government of the United States." Having observed the disciplined advance of Wayne's 
legion, the Six Nations of the Old Northwest, under the supervision of the Governor 
24
 Combs, The Jay Treaty, 138; Weber, The Spanish Frontier, 278, and Gaff, Bayonets in the Wilderness: 
Anthony Wayne's Legion in the Old Northwest. Gerald Combs estimated the total strength of British 
regulars in all of Canada at no more than 3,500 in 1794. David J. Weber estimated the total Spanish 
garrison of Spanish Florida and Louisiana to be no more than 2,000 in 1794. General Wayne commanded at 
least 3,500 regulars during his campaign, although only approximately 2,000 fought in the Battle of Fallen 
Timbers. 
25
 The largest garrisons were the forts at Detroit and Niagara, each only manned by 300 regular troops. 
Each of the other "frontier posts," were manned at 50-60 regulars. Combs, The Jay Treaty, 138. 
26
 Slaughter, The Whiskey Rebellion, 155. 
33 
General of Canada, protested Wayne's movement in the Ohio during peace negotiations 
• 97 
with American Commissioners in the spring of 1793. 
In the autumn of 1793 General Wayne's legion left the banks of the Ohio at Fort 
Washington (Cincinnati, Ohio) and pressed northward into the disputed "Indian Country" 
of the Old Northwest. By December, 1793, Wayne's scouts discovered the battleground 
of General St. Clair's defeat on the banks of the Wabash River and erected Fort Recovery 
"as a perpetual challenge to the Indian warriors and the British outposts."28 
At this pivotal moment in a mounting "frontier crisis," the British Navy began 
enforcing an "order in council" of 6 November 1793, for the seizure of all shipping and 
provisions bound for France, resulting in the capture of as many as two-hundred and fifty 
U.S. ships in the Caribbean without prior warning. Revolutionary France also acted 
aggressively within U.S. territory in 1793 by instructing the minister to the United States 
from the Girondist government of Revolutionary France, Citizen Genet, to raise a militia 
of U.S. citizens in order to mount an attack on Spanish Louisiana and reclaim New 
Orleans. Citizen Genet attempted to recruit France's militia largely from Kentucky 
without the permission of the United States government and commissioned General 
George Rogers Clark "Major General in the Armies of France and Commander-in-Chief 
of the Revolutionary Legions on the Mississippi." 
France's flagrant disregard for diplomatic protocol and willful disregard of U.S. 
sovereignty over its own citizens appeared to give evidence that even the closest ally of 
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the early republic did not respect it as a legitimate government or as an equal state. 
Genet's proposed militia also created a diplomatic crisis for the United States by 
threatening a neighboring nation with military invasion originated from within the United 
States, an act that would most likely have resulted in war with Spain for the United 
States. As George Washington's "neutrality proclamation" was being challenged by both 
France and Great Britain at home and on the high seas, Thomas Jefferson "abandoned the 
storm tossed ship of State," with his 31 December resignation as Secretary of State.31 
Washington nominated Edmund Randolph as Jefferson's successor on 1 January 1794, 
and the Senate confirmed his appointment the next day.32 
Soon after Edmund Randolph's elevation to Secretary of State, the British 
Governor General of Canada made a speech to the Indians of the Old Northwest which 
was meant to innervate the tribes in the face of Wayne's formidable approach. Lord 
Dorchester's infamous words to the chiefs on 10 February 1794 predicted that "from the 
manner in which the people of the United States push on, and act, and talk.. .1 shall not be 
surprised if we are at war with them within the present year." Lord Dorchester's speech 
also appeared to abrogate the Anglo-American treaty of 1783 as he implied that there was 
no defined border for the Americans north of the Ohio River, and refused to acknowledge 
any land claimed by the U.S., "since the year 1783." One week later Lord Dorchester 
authorized the manning of Fort Miamis along the Maumee River (Maumee, Ohio) thirty 
miles south of the British Garrison at Fort Detroit, as a defensive screen to the advance of 
General Wayne's legion and as a gesture of support to the hostile Indians of the Old 
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Northwest. Samuel Flagg Bemis noted that Lord Dorchester probably did not intend for 
his inflammatory comments to be made public, yet they soon appeared in the press. 
When Lord Dorchester's speech reached Philadelphia and London followed by the 
intelligence of British incursion into U.S. territory at Fort Miamis they had a pernicious 
effect on already strained Anglo-American relations. 
By March, 1794, Lord Dorchester's speech appeared in the U.S. press, ominously 
accompanied by reports of British seizures of U.S. ships in the Caribbean under the 
6 November 1793 order in council. War with Great Britain loomed closer. The U.S. 
congress issued a thirty day embargo for all British goods on 25 March 1794, as it 
contemplated more permanent economic retaliation. As the nation approached a war 
footing Edmund Randolph and a handful of Federalists suggested the appointment of an 
envoy extraordinary to Great Britain specifically for the purpose of negotiating a peaceful 
settlement to the growing tensions. On 12 March 1794 Senator Oliver Ellsworth of 
Connecticut, representing a coalition of Federalists, presented the president with their 
suggestion that a special envoy be sent to London. Two days later Edmund Randolph 
privately advised the president that a mission by a special envoy, separate from the 
current U.S. Minister to Great Britain and specifically instructed to negotiate key issues 
such as spoliations from the recent seizures of U.S. shipping and the evacuation of the 
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posts of the Old Northwest, might prove more expeditious and more successful than 
allowing the British Foreign Ministry to continue to "filibuster the incumbent minister." 
Washington considered these proposals as congress imposed the embargo and 
authorized military preparations. On 8 April Secretary of State Randolph reiterated his 
support for a special envoy and presented Washington with a persuasive essay on the 
benefits of sending a specific mission to London. Randolph's argument persuaded the 
president, who after considering John Adams, Thomas Jefferson and Alexander 
Hamilton, nominated Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, John Jay, as the "special envoy 
to the court of St. James" in April, 1794.37 
Chief Justice Jay departed for London on 12 May. Although the spirit of Jay's 
mission temporarily quelled the tide of anti-British economic legislation pending in 
congress, news of the fortification of Fort Miamis reached Philadelphia shortly after his 
1 0 
departure and re-ignited the threat of war. The British occupation of the seven posts 
within U.S. territory had been tolerated while the disputes raised by the Definitive Treaty 
of 1783 were negotiated diplomatically; however, garrisoning a new fortification not 
covered under the status quo which existed at the end of the Revolutionary War 
represented an ominous incursion into the United States by the British military with 
egregious disregard to U.S. sovereignty. George Washington and his Secretary of State 
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responded swiftly and decisively as General Wayne fortified his own position at Fort 
Recovery just over one-hundred miles to the south of the new British garrison. 
On 20 May 1794 Secretary of State Edmund Randolph presented the British 
Minister to the United States, George Hammond, with a scathing diplomatic ultimatum. 
Randolph began by citing Lord Dorchester's incendiary remarks of 10 February to the 
Indians of the Old Northwest and concluded that ample time had elapsed for the British 
government to recant or at least denounce Dorchester's actions. If the British Governor 
General was overreaching his official instructions, the absence of an official retraction 
implied to Randolph that Lord Dorchester was acting with at least the tacit approval of 
Great Britain.39 Randolph accurately characterized Lord Dorchester's speech to the chiefs 
as an effort to "foster and encourage in the Indians [,] hostile dispositions towards the 
United States," and argued that it was reasonable to conclude that the attempted peace 
with the Indians the previous year had failed because of similar influence by the British 
Governor General of Canada.40 
Randolph went on to state that although Lord Dorchester's speech "only 
forebodes hostility: the intelligence which has been received this morning is, if true, 
hostility itself." Randolph then detailed the intelligence the president had received of 
Lieutenant Governor Simcoe's construction and manning of a fort "at the rapids of the 
Miami," along the Maumee River. Randolph summarized the decade of negotiations over 
the existing forts "which were confessedly within the limits of the Unites States," but 
noted that "the present aggression" could not be placed in the same category because Fort 
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Miamis was a new fortification within U.S. territory not in existence at the end of the 
Revolutionary War, and therefore not covered under the status quo.41 Randolph called it 
"an act... calculated to support an enemy whom we are seeking to bring to peace." 
The Secretary of State offered the recent mission of special envoy John Jay to 
London as an "unequivocal proof... of the sincere wish of our government to preserve 
peace," but sternly warned that "our honor and safety require that an invasion shall be 
repelled." Randolph's conclusion cited the president's orders for Randolph to demand 
that the British government "take immediate and effectual measures.. .to suppress these 
hostile movements" accompanied by a dark caution that "the army of the Unites States, in 
their march against the enemy, will not be able to distinguish between them, and any 
other people, associated with the war." Randolph closed his letter by diplomatically 
placing the moral imperative upon Great Britain to mollify the tension; "those who shall 
throw obstacles in the way of negotiation and tranquility.. .shall be responsible for all the 
unhappy consequences."43 
George Washington submitted Randolph's correspondence to congress the 
following day with a covering letter stating that it explained "the state of affairs between 
us and the six nations, and the probable cause to which it is owing." Washington also 
highlighted the "encroachment made upon our territory, by an officer and party of British 
troops," and fully endorsed every word of Randolph's enclosed letter to the British 
minister. The president concluded; "It cannot be necessary to comment upon the very 
serious nature of such an encroachment, nor to urge, that this new state of things suggests 
41
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the propriety of placing the United States in a posture of effectual preparation for an 
event, which, notwithstanding the endeavors making to avert it, may, by circumstances 
beyond our control, be forced upon us;" war with Great Britain.44 
On 22 May George Hammond attempted to respond to Randolph's lecture, but 
only further inflamed U.S. outrage and embarrassed the British government. Hammond 
began his reply by protesting to Randolph "the style and manner in which you have 
thought it proper to address me on the present occasion." The British minister's arrogant 
opening implied that he was an equal to Randolph rather than a foreign ambassador 
addressing a minister or secretary of a government and reinforced a popular belief that 
the British government did not recognize the U.S. as an equal state. Hammond went on to 
claim that "I never can acknowledge the right of this government to require from me.. .an 
explanation of any measure emanating from the Governors of Canada."45 The hubris of 
Hammond's statement actually exemplified the issue: What other channel was there if the 
Secretary of State of the United States could not ask the king's representative what the 
British government's intentions were along the U.S. border and within U.S. territory? 
Hammond was "willing to admit the authenticity of the speech to certain Indian 
nations," but notably did not offer a retraction of Governor Lord Dorchester's remarks, 
nor did he cast any doubt about Lord Grenville's support of such activities. When 
addressing the construction of the "fort at the foot of the Miamis," Hammond feigned 
ignorance, claiming to have "no intelligence that such an event has actually occurred." 
The British minister further parsed words over the location of the alleged fort and the 
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possible justification of its existence for "protecting subjects of his Majesty residing in 
the districts dependent upon the fort of Detroit," which was threatened "by the 
approaching American Army."46 
President Washington submitted Hammond's official reply to congress the day 
that it was received, 23 May 1794. Within days the complete correspondence appeared in 
the press in Philadelphia. Randolph's carefully crafted words under the cover of the 
president made the implications of British treachery with the Indians of the Old 
Northwest public knowledge. The Secretary of State's clear warning that hostility, 
aggression, and invasion would be repelled by force, and that enemy combatants co-
mingled against the Army of the United States would all be treated equally became a 
matter of public record in congress and public notice in the press. The Secretary of State 
had addressed the British government as an equal sovereign state invoking the familiar 
language of international law and diplomacy. Edmund Randolph had diplomatically and 
morally cornered the British government. 
By mid 1794 "the American cauldron was boiling."47 Alexander Hamilton's 
efforts to collect taxes from the Western Counties of Pennsylvania were being met by 
mob violence and the harassment of tax collectors, which led British officials in North 
America to believe that the United States "was about to crumble" due to the increasing 
differences between the western counties and the eastern government. Lieutenant 
Governor Simcoe boasted in June 1794 that "a successful war waged from Canada would 
soon separate Kentucky and the other 'colonies' of the United States west of the 
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Alleghenies." The pressure mounted in late June when a full scale attack by the main 
body of the Indian Confederation, augmented by Canadian militia in Native American 
dress and supervised by the British-Indian Department in British Uniforms, was 
successfully repelled by General Wayne's army at Fort Recovery.50 
As General Wayne methodically advanced northward in the Ohio Territory during 
July, 1794, civil tensions in the Western Counties of Pennsylvania escalated to violence 
with a siege upon the home of John Neville, a federal tax collector, and the abduction of a 
federal marshal sent to enforce the law.51 During the first week in August George 
Washington's cabinet debated the use of force to suppress the rising rebellion in the 
Western Counties. Alexander Hamilton famously argued in favor of the use of militia to 
compel obedience to the federal government, and Henry Knox less enthusiastically 
agreed with him.52 
On 5 August 1794, Edmund Randolph submitted his position on the use of force 
to quell the insurrection in the Western Counties to the president. Randolph utilized 
familiar republican ideology of the founding generation by invoking the image of tyranny 
and the horror of forced obedience through military coercion to strenuously argue against 
the use of military force upon the citizenry. Randolph succinctly identified western 
disaffection with the eastern government. Edmund Randolph cited the known British 
subterfuge in the Ohio with the Native Americans as he argued that "any alienation of the 
west would be to the advantage of Great Britain." Randolph believed that credible 
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evidence which exposed British machinations to foment civil unrest would serve to unite 
U.S. citizens against further British interference within U.S. territory and quickly defuse 
the rising insurrection. Conversely, Randolph feared that the threat of an eastern army 
might serve to "unite the discontented elements against a common enemy" in the federal 
government, and drive the rebels into the protection and support of the British 
government. The most incriminating allegation against Randolph in Dispatch no. 10 
involved his attempt to gain actionable intelligence about British interference with the 
help of the French minister in a conversation that took place the same day as Randolph 
en 
submitted his position paper to the president. 
While George Washington's cabinet debated the use of force to quell the rising 
"Whiskey Rebellion" in the Western Counties during the first week of August, Anthony 
Wayne established and fortified Fort Defiance along the Maumee River just fifty miles 
southwest of the British at Fort Miamis.54 Wayne's legion then marched northeast along 
the Maumee River to imminent contact with the Indian confederacy. On 20 August 1794, 
General Anthony Wayne's Legion of the United States advanced upon the Indian 
Confederacy located just two miles in front of the British at Fort Miamis. The 
confederacy was established in a defensive position in a forest that had been devastated 
by tornadoes several years earlier creating a labyrinth of twisted trees, roots and thick 
underbrush impassable by cavalry or massed troops in formation. Wayne's well trained 
and disciplined army advanced slowly, yet violently, along the Maumee and methodically 
drove the Indians from the protection of the "fallen timbers." The survivors of Wayne's 
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ruthless attack retreated for the protection of the British at Fort Miamis with the Legion 
of the United States in pursuit.55 
Secretary of State Randolph's forceful diplomacy of May, 1794, and Wayne's 
successful military campaign collided decisively with the British-Indian Alliance at the 
gates of Fort Miamis. As the remnants of the Indian confederacy literally ran for their 
lives to the apparent safety of the British fort and their professed allies, Edmund 
Randolph's strong words that had sternly warned the British government of the 
consequences of its actions compelled the commandant of Fort Miamis to close the gates 
and refuse aid to the fleeing warriors. Edmund Randolph had plainly and publicly 
accused Lord Dorchester of "supporting an enemy whom we are seeking to bring to 
peace."56 If the British army were to openly support the fleeing Indian Confederacy 
within sight of the advancing Legion of the United States it would have confirmed 
Randolph's accusations and justified an armed response by the advancing legion which 
would surely have led to war. Randolph's warning that the advancing army would not 
discern British from Indian combatants was so sound that the gates of Fort Miamis were 
closed to all, including fleeing British regulars of the British-Indian Department and the 
Canadian militia who had been fighting alongside the confederacy. Randolph's public 
warning made it impossible for the British government to ever protest or even mention 
the loss of life and casualties it suffered by participating in the Battle of Fallen Timbers.57 
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The commandant of Fort Miamis, Major Campbell of the Welsh 24 Regiment of 
Foot, had a more immediate, tactical concern as Wayne's legion surrounded Fort Miamis 
and trapped the occupants in a siege. Major Campbell's cadre of two-hundred British 
infantrymen augmented by the sixty Canadian Rangers were no match for General 
Wayne's battle proven army of well over fifteen-hundred troops, cavalry and artillery. 
General Wayne had been specifically authorized by President Washington to attack the 
British at Fort Miamis and Detroit if he deemed it necessary. Wayne also had copies of 
Secretary of State Randolph's May rebuke of British policy in North America. Major 
Campbell's detachment was dispatched from its headquarters at Fort Detroit on the orders 
of Lieutenant Governor Simcoe following Lord Dorchester's controversial remarks to the 
Indian confederation and reinforced after the diplomatic exchange between Randolph and 
Hammond. Both Wayne and Major Campbell were well aware of the diplomatic tension 
between the United States and Great Britain, and both commanders in the field would 
have known the consequences of armed conflict at this critical moment. 
Wayne did not assault the British garrison because he did not need to in order to 
accomplish his mission, but razed the area within approximately eight miles of the fort by 
burning all of the fields, Indian villages and garrison buildings not within the walls of the 
fort with the helpless, besieged British Army powerless to stop them. Wayne further 
taunted the British commander by marching his legion "within arm's reach" around the 
perimeter of the fort while Major Campbell trained his loaded and primed guns upon 
fighting with the Indians against the Americans in the Revolutionary War. The Canadians suffered at least 
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them, creating a potentially Lexington and Concord moment. The tension would have 
been so great that if a gunshot rang out anywhere, no one would have ever known who 
shot first, but an armed assault on the fort would have been certain, initiating war 
between the United States and Great Britain as Lord Dorchester had foretold and 
Secretary of State Randolph had warned. After three days of "scorched earth" 
destruction, Wayne's legion withdrew from Fort Miamis leaving the humiliated British 
commandant of Fort Miamis alone in a sea of ash. The message to the Atlantic world was 
clear; General Wayne had emasculated British Arms on U.S. soil.59 
The Indian confederacy was betrayed by the British refusal of aid in its moment 
of desperate need. Years of promises, material support, and inflammatory rhetoric 
culminated with a cold reception at a critical moment. The closed gates caused 
indignation and hatred in the bosom of many Indians who forever after the Battle of 
Fallen Timbers angrily referred only to "the damned British." According to Alan D. Gaff, 
the Indian Confederacy would have been able to recover from a single, though 
significant, military defeat, but "the conduct of the British Fort dispirited the 
Confederates much more than the issue of the battle." Although the chiefs considered the 
defeat "a misfortune that might be repaired with glory,—another time," it was the perfidy 
of the British during the battle that "they did not know how to remedy."60 The British-
Indian alliance in North America was therefore dissolved from that moment. 
The deflation of the British-Indian alliance doomed the grander British plans for 
an "Indian buffer state" north of the Ohio, or the annexation of western territories of the 
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United States. Without a compliant surrogate, Great Britain was powerless to control the 
interior of the North American continent. 
The effects were nearly immediate. Just two months after the Battle of Fallen 
Timbers, the Whiskey Rebellion in the Western Counties of Pennsylvania was met with 
the federal force Randolph had opposed, yet the militia sent to quell the rebellion met 
little resistance. Among the many explanations offered for the lack of armed resistance to 
the militia, one plausible factor was that Wayne's defeat of the Indian Confederacy 
significantly reduced Native American harassment of western settlers north of the Ohio, 
removing one of the chief complaints of the Western Counties. Wayne's successful 
campaign had demonstrated that the federal government could in fact protect its citizens 
west of the Appalachians.61 It is also likely that Wayne's legion in the field just two-
hundred miles from Pittsburgh posed a credible federal deterrent to resistance. 
News of Wayne's victory reached Lord Grenville in London during mid-October, 
just as his negotiations with John Jay were approaching a conclusion. When Jay's Treaty 
was concluded the following month the British government agreed to peacefully 
surrender the disputed posts by 1796, achieving one of George Washington's highest 
negotiating priorities.62 Samuel Flagg Bemis suggested that Lord Grenville had intended 
to surrender the posts early in Jay's negotiations, and simply relocate them to the 
Canadian side of the border, which in several cases they did. But Bemis did not 
consider Fallen Timbers to have been a tipping point. The loss of the British-Indian 
alliance mooted the significance of British forts on either side of the imaginary British-
American border. Without Native American military support in the northwest Great 
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Britain was unable to control the continent from either side of the Great Lakes. Slaughter 
observed that the removal of British occupation from the Old Northwest was critical to 
ensuring a lasting U.S. peace with the Native Americans by physically removing their 
chief protagonist.64 
Secretary of State Edmund Randolph's diplomatic flanking of the British 
government during May 1794 made it virtually impossible for Lord Dorchester, 
Lieutenant Governor Simcoe, or the commandant of Fort Miamis to openly support their 
Indian allies even during General Wayne's punishing victory at Fallen Timbers, 
conclusively severing the British-Indian alliance. The British Empire was therefore 
deprived of its plans for expanded control within North America, and Jay's Treaty of 19 
November 1794 surrendering the strategic forts within U.S. territory was an ominous 
reminder. Lord Grenville's diplomatic dispatches to George Hammond the following day 
included the signed treaty along with futile instructions for Hammond to continue with 
previous British plans to attempt to manipulate peace negotiations of the American Indian 
War supervised by the British government, preferably through the more tractable 
Alexander Hamilton.65 
Lord Grenville's confidential dispatch no. 22 to George Hammond of 20 
November 1794 was dedicated entirely to his displeasure with Edmund Randolph. Lord 
Grenville described Randolph's May publication of official correspondence between two 
ministers as "perfectly improper," and felt that Randolph's tone showed "hostility 
towards Great Britain." Grenville was particularly stung by Randolph's publication of the 
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apparently accurate intelligence "that the Indian war had been promoted and encouraged 
by England."66 
Randolph's diplomacy of May 1794 was much more than improper or 
embarrassing. For the first time since independence a United States Secretary of State had 
spoken from a position of strength; diplomacy supported by real and credible economic 
sanction and military capability. Secretary of State Randolph had addressed the state of 
Great Britain as an equal, not as a pliable supplicant. By exposing British collusion with 
the Indian Confederacy and diplomatically invoking the threat of war under international 
law Randolph had hobbled the British Empire's strategic and economic plans for North 
America. Lord Grenville therefore lashed out at his nemesis and informed Hammond that 
it would not be possible to conduct future business with the United States if "conduct of 
this kind continues." The British Foreign Secretary desired a more malleable Secretary 
of State in the United States. 
Lord Grenville specifically instructed Hammond to "converse confidentially on 
this subject with those persons in America who are friends.. .in the view that some steps 
may be taken... so as to either convince Mr. Randolph of the necessity of his adopting a 
different language and conduct, or at least place him in a situation where his personal 
sentiments may not endanger the peace of two countries between whom I trust a 
permanent union is now established." Jerald Combs and Louis Martin Sears observed 
that contrary to its aggressive posture in North America prior to the French Revolution 
and the war in Europe, peace with the United States became important to Great Britain in 
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leave the British coalition." Combs also noted that the congressional embargos had stung 
Great Britain in the spring of 1794, and as with Bemis, Combs concluded that Great 
Britain feared further economic distress that would accompany a war with the United 
States.69 Lord Grenville needed what he perceived as a more Anglo-friendly Secretary of 
State in the United States. 
In November 1794, long before Jay's Treaty ever reached the United States, the 
British Foreign Secretary identified Edmund Randolph as an impediment to British 
foreign policy and articulated a plan in writing to the British minister in the United States 
to affect his removal from prominence. Dispatch no. 10 was a welcome weapon to 
achieve Lord Grenville's goal. Yet a brief history of Dispatch no. 10 while in the 
possession of the British government superimposed upon the itinerary of Jay's Treaty 
from the moment it was signed in Great Britain shows rather clearly that although 
Dispatch no. 10 was undoubtedly intended to discredit Edmund Randolph as planned, it 
was never intended to be used to influence Washington's ratification of Jay's Treaty. 
Due to the vagaries of war between the maritime powers of Europe and the 
treacherous weather conditions on the North Atlantic during the winter months, John Jay 
sent two copies of the signed treaty to the United States via separate couriers on 20 and 
21 November 1794, respectively. One copy placed aboard the Tankerville, was thrown 
overboard and lost at sea to avoid capture when the Tankerville was captured by the 
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French vessel, The Lovely Lass. The second copy of Jay's Treaty, carried by Captain 
Blaney of Virginia, narrowly escaped the same fate, but still took three months to cross 
Combs, The Jay Treaty, 145; Louis Martin Sears, George Washington and the French Revolution, 154. 
Conway, Omitted Chapters, 233, 293. 
50 
the Atlantic. Jay's Treaty did not arrive in Philadelphia until 7 March 1795, three days 
after congress had adjourned.71 
Three weeks later the diplomatic pouch containing Dispatch no. 10 to France was 
similarly cast overboard to avoid interception when the French corvette Jean Bart was 
taken by H.M. Frigate Cerebus on 28 March 1795, but the packet was recovered and 
taken back to England where it arrived in mid-April and was forwarded to the Foreign 
Ministry. On 9 May Lord Grenville forwarded a precis of the captured dispatches "from 
the different ministers and agents of the French convention in America..." to George 
Hammond in Philadelphia. Grenville promised to provide the originals at a later date with 
the hope that they might be communicated to "well-disposed persons in America" and 
prove "useful to the King's Service," vaguely alluding to his previously stated plans for 
Randolph. Lord Grenville's 9 May dispatches also acknowledged the capture of the 
Tankerville and the loss of the original treaty dispatches. Grenville therefore provided 
duplicates of all correspondence concerning Jay's Treaty and queried Hammond about 
the status of the other copies. On 9 May 1794, when Lord Grenville took the first tangible 
step in his plan to remove Randolph from office, he was as yet unsure if Jay's Treaty had 
even arrived in the United States. 
At the moment that the original copy of Dispatch no. 10 departed London the 
intended application of the seemingly incriminating dispatch could only have been to 
achieve Lord Grenville's stated goal of removing Edmund Randolph from a position of 
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influence within the government. By June 1795 Lord Grenville had received George 
Hammond's March and April dispatches announcing the arrival of the treaty in 
Philadelphia, the constitutional ratification process it would have to follow, and the 
Senate's scheduled 8 June special session to consider the treaty for advice and consent. 
Lord Grenville forwarded the originals of the captured French dispatches to George 
Hammond from London on 4 June 1795, with specific instructions to "communicate such 
parts of them as you may deem expedient to well disposed persons in America," 
reiterating his scheme to "place [Randolph] in a situation" where his influence could no 
longer endanger British plans for North America.73 Lord Grenville was aware that the 
Senate had not even begun its consideration of Jay's Treaty when he posted the damaging 
dispatches to George Hammond making it impossible for Dispatch no. 10 to have been 
intended to influence its ratification. The marginalization of Edmund Randolph remained 
Lord Grenville's stated goal. 
Dispatch no. 10 crossed the Atlantic as the senate considered Jay's Treaty and 
returned it to the president with the exception of Article XII on 24 June 1795. 
Washington delayed signing the treaty in order to consult with his cabinet over the legal 
implications of ratification with an excepted article. While the cabinet deliberated over 
the ratification process, Great Britain resumed seizures of U.S. shipping under a renewed 
provision order. Washington's initial refusal to ratify during the existence of the 
provision order began in early July, 1795, while Dispatch no. 10 was still en-route from 
London.74 Therefore it simply was not possible that Dispatch no. 10 was sent to force 
Washington's hand, nor to discredit Randolph because of his opposition to ratification as 
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the ratification process had not yet begun and Washington's objection to the provision 
order did not yet exist when Lord Grenville forwarded the dispatches to discredit 
Randolph in early June. 
Lord Grenville's desire to remove Randolph from prominence within George 
Washington's sphere of influence was a result of Randolph's well articulated defense of 
U.S. sovereignty to British incursions in 1794, which Grenville interpreted as hostility 
towards Great Britain. Dispatch no. 10 arrived in Philadelphia in late July 1795, just as 
the Secretary of State once again stood firm against British disregard for U.S. 
sovereignty. Although Randolph found several faults with Jay's Treaty, his only stated 
opposition to its ratification was the asymmetric relationship perpetuated by Great 
Britain's seizure of U.S. shipping. According to Randolph, who did not believe that a 
treaty could be concluded between two unequal states, "the order for capturing provisions 
[was] too irreconcilable with a state of harmony for the treaty to be put in motion during 
its existence."75 
The presentation of Dispatch no. 10 to embarrass the only member of the 
president's cabinet who advised against the ratification of Jay's Treaty during British 
seizures of U.S. shipping gave the appearance of a well timed attack to direct events in 
favor of Great Britain. At the time however, none of the cabinet members actually knew 
how long Hammond or the British government had been in possession of Dispatch no. 
10, and Randolph unsuccessfully attempted to discern the timeline of Dispatch no. 10 for 
his Vindication. Although Randolph suspected Lord Grenville had "particularly 
Reardon, Edmund Randolph, 301. Randolph's position on Jay's treaty is explained in more detail below 
in Chapter II, 57-59. 
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instructed" George Hammond to orchestrate his demise, he was unable to prove it. The 
assumption in 1795 was that Dispatch no. 10 had been played as a tool to affect 
ratification via Randolph's removal, an inaccurate assumption which has resonated 
throughout the historiography of Edmund Randolph's political assassination ever since. 
Edmund Randolph did not win the Battle of Fallen Timbers nor did he break the 
British-Indian alliance in 1794 alone. Strategic military planning, a credible military 
force and economic sanctions combined with the Secretary of State's timely, forceful 
defense of U.S. sovereignty to compel Great Britain to abandon its Indian allies in their 
time of need. Correctly identifying the source and depth of Lord Grenville's antipathy for 
Edmund Randolph and the true origins of his plan to remove Randolph from office more 
accurately depicts the scene in 1794-1795 while it greatly informs traditional histories of 
the early republic. 
Samuel Flagg Bemis' early twentieth-century work on Jay's Treaty refused to 
address Randolph's imbroglio and relegated the affair to a footnote, claiming that it 
"belonged to the history of ratification, not the negotiation of Jay's Treaty."77 Later 
historians of Jay's Treaty have treated Randolph in a similar manner. Yet acknowledging 
Randolph's diplomacy of May, 1794, and the impact it had on the British-Indian alliance 
during Jay's negotiations in London moves the story of the British plot against Randolph 
squarely into the history of Jay's negotiations and therefore Jay's Treaty. Re-inserting the 
Secretary of State into the origin of Jay's mission, treaty negotiations, and foreign 
diplomacy of the early republic greatly enhances existing work on Jay's Treaty. 
Randolph, Vindication, 21-23. 
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Because the story of Dispatch no. 10 and Edmund Randolph was believed to be a 
function of the 1795 ratification of Jay's Treaty, long after the militia had returned from 
the Western Counties, Randolph's affair has been either omitted from histories of the 
Whiskey Rebellion or appears as another footnote or epilogue. Although Randolph's 
political demise occurred well after the Whiskey Rebellion and would itself not be 
pertinent, the diplomacy of May 1794 which led to his downfall had a positive impact on 
the dissatisfied Western Counties. Defusing the British-Indian alliance eased the Indian 
threat to settlers in the west while disabling British and Spanish plans to cede "the 
colonies of the United States West of the Alleghenies." Edmund Randolph clearly 
suspected British subterfuge with the rebels of the Western Counties and actively sought 
credible intelligence to prove it, as attested to in the 1794 dispatches of Citizen Fauchet, 
situating Randolph's demise well within the history of the Whiskey Rebellion. 
Political histories of the Federalist Era have reiterated the incorrect assumption 
that Dispatch no. 10 was a tool for ending Randolph's opposition to the ratification of 
Jay's Treaty, missing the importance of Randolph's diplomacy of 1794 while 
disregarding the itinerary of Dispatch no. 10 while in British hands. Biographers of 
Washington also treat the revelation of Dispatch no. 10 as entirely an event of 1795, 
connected only to the ratification of Jay's Treaty. Randolph's only true biographer, John 
J. Reardon, underestimated Randolph's diplomacy of May by omitting it, and concluded 
that by mid-1794 he had proven to be a weak Secretary of State who "could not be 
counted on to formulate the government's response to the changing diplomatic 
climate."78 Yet weaving Randolph's diplomacy into the stories of the Whiskey Rebellion, 
Jay's Treaty, the Battle of Fallen Timbers, and the Federalist Era suggests that Randolph 
78
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had a well informed command of the situation and his diplomacy made a significant 
impact on the survival of the early republic. 
Edmund Randolph staunchly defended U.S. sovereignty and legitimacy as a new 
nation and in so doing incurred the wrath of the British Empire. The true story of 
Edmund Randolph and Dispatch no. 10 reveals that the frustrated British Foreign 
Secretary, Lord Grenville, formulated and executed a plan to remove his counterpart in 
the U.S. government from office. By successfully "placing [Randolph] in a situation 
where his personal sentiments," could no longer "endanger" the foreign policy goals of 
Great Britain, the British Foreign Ministry succeeded in removing a formidable 
impediment to British foreign policy objectives while manipulating the composition of 
Washington's cabinet into a collection of pro-British Federalists.79 The fact that the plan 
came to fruition during the ratification of Jay's Treaty was merely a misleading 
coincidence. 
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Chapter II 
Dispelling the Myth of Washington and Dispatch no. 10 
Ostensibly the release of Dispatch no. 10 by the British Foreign Ministry was 
meant to discredit Secretary of State Edmund Randolph and insure Washington's 
ratification of Jay's Treaty. The timing of events certainly appears to support that theory 
that was first offered by Randolph in Vindication and has been steadily reinforced over 
time. The senate approved Jay's Treaty on 24 June 1795, but excluded Article XII 
because it prohibited the exportation from America of tropical products, including those 
grown in the United States."1 The senate's consent to Jay's Treaty with the exception of 
Article XII presented Washington with serious legal, procedural and constitutional issues. 
While Washington deliberated over how to proceed with Jay's Treaty news of more 
British seizures of U.S. shipping bound for France under a recently renewed "provision 
order" reached him in early July 1795. Enraged by the assault on U.S. sovereignty and 
the disregard for his "neutrality proclamation" of 1793, Washington sought the written 
advice of his cabinet, further delaying ratification. 
Secretaries Wolcott and Pickering each immediately recommended ratification 
without re-submitting Article XII to the senate, but made no comment upon the odious 
provision order and the British seizures. On 12 July 1795, Randolph provided 
Washington with a lengthy legal analysis that greatly favored the treaty and 
recommended ratification. As an architect of Jay's mission from the beginning, Secretary 
1
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of State Randolph was intimately aware of the successes and shortcomings of the treaty. 
Randolph was, in fact, disappointed that the posts would not be surrendered until 1796, 
that the accommodation for spoliations upon seized shipping was too weak, that there 
was no specific time established for an admiralty court to adjudicate the sale of captured 
U.S. "prizes," and that there was no specific prohibition on impressments of U.S. seamen 
by the British Navy.3 
Jay's Treaty had faults. Moncure Daniel Conway characterized it as as a "national 
humiliation," and "evidence that Downing Street was still master of Independence Hall."4 
Yet although Randolph believed "that we had gained far less than we had surrendered," 
the Secretary of State endorsed the treaty for no less than ten enumerated reasons. 
Randolph's reasons to "recommend ratification," were that the treaty would secure peace 
with Great Britain, and alleviate international pressure for the United States to form an 
alliance with any of the warring Atlantic nations. The Secretary of State also believed 
that France would not object to Jay's Treaty because it appeared to be so unfavorable to 
the U.S. that it would not be perceived as an alliance that violated Washington's policy of 
neutrality.5 
The Secretary of State's reasons to "dissuade rejection," were that Jay had not 
exceeded his instruction from Washington and that given the geo-political climate there 
was little chance of achieving better terms. Randolph also feared that France's turmoil 
during its revolution might further embolden Great Britain to "her former arrogance," 
3
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further diminishing hopes of improving the terms. Politically, Randolph warned that 
public opinion might wane if the treaty were refused simply because "we do not have all 
of the advantages on our side..." Edmund Randolph the politician also observed that to 
reject the treaty would publicly embarrass the twenty senators who had given their 
consent to the contentious treaty, and risk a permanent alienation of their support.6 
Contrary to most accounts of Jay's Treaty, Edmund Randolph actually 
recommended its ratification to Washington. However, as a staunch defender of U.S. 
sovereignty and a student of international law, Randolph strenuously objected to the 
resumption of British seizures of U.S. shipping. Randolph argued that a treaty "is the act 
of two independent nations; neither having a right to dictate to the other; each 
determining upon what it will yield or accept." Randolph concluded that British seizures 
placed Great Britain and the United States in an asymmetric, unequal relationship and 
that "the order for capturing provisions [was] too irreconcilable with a state of harmony 
for the treaty to be signed during its existence."7 Randolph's only stated objection to the 
ratification of Jay's Treaty was the British enforcement of the provision order. 
George Washington agreed, and on 13 July 1795 directed Randolph to meet with 
George Hammond to announce to the British government that "the President cannot 
persuade himself that he ought to ratify during the existence of the order." Hammond was 
unmoved by the declaration. After hearing of Hammond's unyielding position, 
Washington told Randolph that "he would never ratify if the provision order were not 
removed out of the way."8 Washington may have agreed with Randolph that the 
provision order impinged U.S. sovereignty and must be lifted before any treaty could be 
6
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concluded, but to George Hammond the stern messenger and only cabinet opposition to 
ratification was Edmund Randolph. The British Minister in the United States received his 
own recall orders along with the promised originals of Dispatch no. 10 just two weeks 
later.9 
George Washington retired to Mt. Vernon on 15 July 1795 for a summer retreat 
meant to last until the end of September, with the question of signing Jay's Treaty 
unresolved. However, the un-ratified treaty sparked intense national debate which 
compelled the president to return to Philadelphia earlier than planned. Washington 
arrived in Philadelphia on 11 August 1795 and was immediately given the incriminating 
correspondence by Secretaries Pickering and Wolcott. The next day Washington 
announced that he would sign Jay's Treaty and one week after being given Dispatch 
no. 10 the treaty was ratified.10 An obvious conclusion has been that Washington 
determined to sign Jay's Treaty immediately after reading Dispatch no. 10 because he 
had "lost confidence in his Secretary of State" and worried that "if Randolph really was 
serving the French government his advice to delay signing the treaty could have been 
directed by his French masters."11 Yet it is most likely that these assumptions are 
incorrect. The true history of these events has been occluded by a historiography which 
has embraced the accusation of Randolph's defalcation and therefore discounted 
Washington's own resolve to act decisively upon the issues challenging the early 
republic. 
The idea that Washington abruptly announced he would sign Jay's Treaty as a 
reaction to being shown Dispatch no. 10 temporarily suspends the traditional memory of 
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George Washington as a man of sound judgment and ignores his well known modus 
operandi. Throughout his entire career Washington was frequently criticized for delaying 
decisions while carefully gathering facts and the opinions of his advisors. While in the 
military Washington was guided by "war councils" and frequently deferred to the 
majority opinion of his generals. As president Washington relied upon the majority 
opinion of his cabinet. George Washington exhibited his usual decision making behavior 
with respect to the ratification of Jay's Treaty by withholding his signature after gaining 
the senate's advice and consent while he sought legal procedural advice, the written 
opinions of his cabinet, and listened to public opinion. As with other delays his 
ponderous matrix had caused, Washington was harshly criticized for his delay in deciding 
for or against Jay's Treaty. 
The suggestion that within twenty-four hours of reading Dispatch no. 10 
Washington completely reversed his previously stated position not to ratify Jay's Treaty 
during the existence of the provision order not only ignores Washington's character, it 
also disregards substantial evidence from Washington's own correspondence that he 
planned a "conjunct revision" of the treaty ratification nearly two weeks before he 
returned to Philadelphia. The president's return to the seat of government more than a 
month earlier than planned as well as his own explanation for returning to Philadelphia 
clearly signaled that he intended to take action on the treaty long before he knew of the 
existence of Dispatch no. 10. 
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The contents of Jay's Treaty were kept secret even from the other cabinet 
members until the treaty and Mr. Jay's instructions were presented to the senate for 
advice and consent. Speculation in the press as to the possible contents of the treaty lead 
to a flood of misinformation as political tensions heightened. In an effort to abate 
speculation George Washington ordered the contents of Jay's Treaty published on 29 
June 1795. However, before Jay's treaty was officially published it was leaked by 
Senator Thomas Mason to the notoriously pro-Republican Philadelphia paper The Aurora 
General Advertiser, where it appeared in print the same day the president ordered its 
official release.14 The resulting firestorm of disapproval was swift, furious and 
predictable. Pro-British Federalists generally fell in line with Alexander Hamilton who 
favored the treaty for the peaceful removal of the British from the forts they occupied in 
U.S. territory, and for the opportunity to negotiate the still unsettled pre-revolutionary 
war debts to British merchants. Pro-French Republicans despised the treaty because it 
was perceived as pro-British and claimed that Jay's Treaty represented an Anglo-
American alliance unfavorable to France. Economically the largely southern planters of 
the nascent republican faction would have preferred not to settle the pre-revolutionary 
war debts they owed to British merchants, and objected to the lack of any provision for 
reparations to slave holders for slaves carried off during the Revolutionary War.15 
During Fourth of July celebrations, just days after the treaty's bootlegged and 
official publications, an angry mob burned John Jay in effigy in Philadelphia and "in so 
many cities that he said he could have walked the length of America by the glow of his 
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own flaming figure." Apparently wary of the growing outcry over the release of Jay's 
Treaty, George Washington asked Alexander Hamilton to keep him informed about "the 
sentiments, entertained of the treaty, and in short on any other interesting subject, with 
which the public mind is occupied.. ."17 Alexander Hamilton argued publicly in New 
York City on 18 July 1795 in favor of the treaty, but only narrowly escaped injury from 
1 R 
stones thrown at him by protestors. The same day, while en-route to Mt. Vernon from 
Philadelphia, Washington was intercepted by an express rider from Boston who delivered 
an official statement from a public meeting of the Boston Selectmen decrying the treaty.19 
Before he even reached Mt. Vernon on 20 July 1795, Washington was well aware of the 
rapidly rising negative public opinion over Jay's Treaty.20 
Washington wrote to Secretary of State Randolph on 22 July 1795, nearly a 
month after Jay's Treaty had passed out of the senate, and characterized the gazettes he 
had read from Pittsburgh and the "result of the Boston Selectmen's proceedings" as "of a 
very unpleasant nature." Washington had previously asked the entire cabinet to help him 
prepare a suitable response to the Boston Selectmen, and therefore asked Randolph in this 
letter to relay to the other cabinet members his official position on the treaty as they 
considered their input.21 Washington wanted the cabinet to know that, ".. .the conditional 
ratification (if the late order which we heard of respecting provision Vessels is not in 
operation) may, on all fit occasions, be spoken of as my determination." Washington also 
answered the procedural constitutional question as to how he would handle the senate's 
16
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rejection of a single article; "My opinion respecting the treaty is the same now, that is: 
namely not favorable to it, but that it is better to ratify in the manner the Senate have 
advised (and with the reservation already mentioned), than to suffer matters as they are, 
unsettled." Washington identified the "unsettled" nature of increasing civil unrest made 
worse by the president's own silence as well as the unsettled status of the treaty which for 
99 
a month awaited only his ratification or definitive rejection. 
By 24 July Washington had already begun to consider returning to Philadelphia 
and informed Randolph that he "could set out as well on a day's as a month's notice, for 
the seat of government; where, if matters are peculiarly embarrassed, I should be in the 
theatre of information, with documents and other aids about me, that could not be had 
here."23 As Washington penned those thoughts Philadelphia was already embroiled by 
protests. During public protests on 23 and 25 July, 1795, opponents of Jay's Treaty in the 
national capital organized mass meetings and prepared written statements to the president 
just as other cities around the country were doing. The rioters impaled a copy of Jay's 
Treaty on a pike and paraded it around the capital city, first to the residence of French 
Minister Adet, and then on to British Minister George Hammond's house where the 
treaty was burned on his doorstep and his home pelted with stones.24 The very seat of 
government was undoubtedly, "peculiarly embarrassed." 
News of the unrest in Philadelphia reached Mount Vernon by 28 July, and on 29 
July 1795 Washington posted two letters to Secretary of State Randolph, one an official 
correspondence and another marked private. Officially the President informed the 
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Secretary of State that "the perturbed state of men's minds respecting the late treaty with 
Gr: Britain together with the proceedings in some of the principal towns to embarrass the 
business have determined me to repair to the seat of government, if I hear nothing from 
you between this and Monday next [3 August 1795] to render it unnecessary." 
Washington noted that he had received more negative resolutions regarding Jay's Treaty 
from the town of Portsmouth, New Hampshire, and the Chamber of Commerce of New 
York City. The president also returned to the Secretary of State the "draft of the 
memorial" to Great Britain and the "rough of a ratification" for Jay's Treaty. Washington 
considered these to be "very important papers" which would "require great attention and 
consideration," and were to be "the primary cause of [his] return to Philadelphia." 
Washington's personal correspondence to Randolph of 29 July revealed that his 
determination to return to Philadelphia was further motivated by his awareness of the 
"violent and extraordinary proceedings which have, and are about taking place, in the 
Northern parts of the union; and may be expected in the Southern...," and because he 
thought "that the memorial; the ratification; and the instructions which are framing; are of 
such vast magnitude as not only to require great individual consideration, but a solemn 
conjunct revision." This quote is often omitted from popular histories of this period, yet it 
clearly indicates that by 29 July 1795, President Washington was planning a complete 
revision to the memorial and ratification therefore indicating a substantial change in his 
position, although his exact thoughts on the revision were not stated. 
25
 Oliver Wolcott to George Washington, Philadelphia, 27 July 1795, in Washington's Papers, Library of 
Congress; George Washington to the Secretary of State, Mount Vernon, 29 July 1795, in Fitzpatrick, 
Writings. 
26
 George Washington to the Secretary of State (marked private), 29 July 1795, in Fitzpatrick, Writings. 
65 
In this private correspondence to Edmund Randolph of 29 July Washington 
accurately summarized current public opinion and the opposition to the treaty as he 
confided to Randolph that he had never seen "a crisis" which so sharply divided public 
opinion. He indentified misleading "gross misrepresentations in the press" published by 
opponents to the Treaty and augured that "if disappointed," the opposition would soon 
attack Washington personally. Washington was also "alarmed" by "the advantage the 
French government may be disposed to make of, the spirit which is at work... that the 
treaty was calculated to favor G. Britain at their expense." Washington feared that the 
French government would take advantage of existing anti-treaty, pro-French sentiments 
to encourage the defeat of Jay's Treaty because he believed that for as long as France was 
at war with Great Britain, "it is feared that it will be their conduct to prevent us from 
being on good terms.. .with that power." Washington was further concerned that allowing 
a foreign government to successfully divide domestic public opinion in an attempt to 
influence U.S. policy was problematic and would be dangerous if not publicly 
addressed. 
In addition to his correspondence with the Secretary of State, Washington wrote a 
personal note to Alexander Hamilton on 29 July 1795, and complained that the "present 
cry against the treaty is like that against a mad dog; and every one, in a manner, seems 
engaged in running it down." Washington went on to analyze in depth the commercial 
benefits of the treaty to the United States and eloquently defined the political factions of 
9R 
support and opposition in greater detail than he had to Randolph. 
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Washington's trenchant assessment of public opinion, the arguments of the 
opposition, the motivations of the French government, and the sharp divisions in 
emerging partisan politics were accurate and well reasoned. His cogent private 
correspondence to his most intimate advisors demonstrated that he was well informed of 
current events and public opinion, and had a very clear understanding of the state of 
affairs in the United States at the end of July, 1795. On 29 July 1795 George Washington 
was more determined than ever to "repair to the seat of government." 
Heavy rains, postal delays and other errors caused the correspondence between 
Mount Vernon and Philadelphia to break down significantly at this crucial juncture 
causing confusion for Washington and the cabinet as well as historians of this period. The 
trouble with the mail began on 31 July 1795, when the postmaster in Alexandria 
inadvertently returned Washington's outgoing correspondence of 29 July (cited above) to 
Mount Vernon. In a letter to Randolph on 31 July Washington addressed this "blunder of 
the postmaster" and lamented the time lost on critical communications which included his 
official and personal correspondence to Randolph, as well as the proposed revisions to 
the memorial and treaty ratification.29 None of those important papers would reach 
Philadelphia until Washington was already en-route. 
The president was also deprived of incoming correspondence from the cabinet at 
this time. Edmund Randolph, writing for the cabinet officers on 29 July 1795, wrote to 
Washington in response to his 24 July suggestion that he "could set out as well on a day's 
as a month's notice, for the seat of government," and advised him to remain at Mount 
Vernon because it would appear imprudent for the president to hastily return to 
Philadelphia. Randolph also advised the president on 29 July that George Hammond had 
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been recalled to London and would have "several things to communicate, by order, 
relative to the treaty.. .which he would impart in a few days..." By 31 July 1795, 
Secretaries Wolcott and Pickering were in possession of Dispatch no. 10, which had 
arrived in the United States along with Hammond's recall orders, and privately urged the 
president to return to Philadelphia.30 Unaware of Dispatch No. 10 and the furtive 
motivation of Wolcott and Pickering, on 31 July 1795 Edmund Randolph also enjoined 
the president to return to Philadelphia stating simply that "nothing but the general crisis 
of public affairs leads to this recommendation; and that it may be important that you 
should do some act in consequence of the communication expected from Mr. Hammond, 
who will sail shortly."31 
Even without postal errors and weather delays it would have been impossible for 
the cabinet members to have received Washington's correspondence of 29 and 31 July 
before they penned their own letters of 29 and 31 July.The cabinet was therefore 
completely unaware that the president already planned to depart Mount Vernon on 
Monday, 3 August 1795, and any assumption that their efforts hastened the president's 
return to Philadelphia neglects Washington's own words. 
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come to the same conclusion, [Washington] was now moved to go back a week sooner than he intended, 
especially after an urgent private letter which Timothy Pickering sent him on his own." Elkins and 
McKitrick, The Age of Federalism, 425. These and other examples ignore the fact that the president had 
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The continued heavy rains prevented Washington from departing Mount Vernon 
on 3 August as he had announced in his previous letters, and as of 4 August he still had 
not received any incoming mail.33 Frustrated by the delays in the post, and the mounting 
unanswered, yet time critical paperwork that was pending, both Randolph and 
Washington curtailed their correspondence at this point.34 Finally, on 5 August 
Washington received an avalanche of correspondence, including the confusing and 
contradictory letters from the cabinet. The weather eventually allowed Washington to 
depart for Philadelphia on 6 August, 1795, but muddy roads and washed out bridges 
made travel slow and tedious. Washington did not reach Philadelphia until 11 August, 
1795.35 
After a three week absence from the seat of government, ten days of which were 
without postal communication with the cabinet during a period that Washington 
characterized as a crisis, he naturally met with Secretary of State Randolph to discuss 
recent events and the pending paperwork regarding Jay's Treaty. Washington's letters 
dictating the need for "a conjunct revision" had been seriously delayed by the postal 
debacle and only preceded Washington's arrival by a few days. Although speculative, it 
is highly likely that Washington intended to discuss the revision of his own position as 
well as those he envisioned for the memorial and the ratification with Randolph. The 
news of George Hammond's recall to London had come during the postal debacle and 
although Washington had finally received the news en-route to Philadelphia this meeting 
already determined to return to Philadelphia and announced a date of his return prior to any letters initiated 
by the cabinet members. 
33
 George Washington to the Secretary of State, Mount Vernon, 4 August 1795, in Fitzpatrick, Writings. 
34
 Reardon, Edmund Randolph, 305; Fitzpatrick, The Writings of George Washington. 
35
 George Washington, Diaries, 208, 209. The travel time included a stop in Georgetown for a meeting of 
the Potomac Company. Most of the delay was due to poor travelling conditions. 
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would have been his first chance to discuss its implications with the Secretary of State. 
However, it was during this working dinner that Timothy Pickering interrupted the 
president to inform him of Pickering's suspicion "that man [Randolph] is a traitor," 
which apparently curtailed Washington's plans for the meeting.36 Oliver Wolcott 
delivered Dispatch No. 10 to the president later that evening.37 Washington's receipt of 
Dispatch no. 10 on 11 August was purely a function of his first contact with the cabinet 
after a long absence. 
In the scant hours between his dinner with Randolph on 11 August, receiving 
Dispatch no. 10 and the scheduled cabinet meeting on 12 August 1795, Washington did 
not initiate any correspondence nor create any record of his thoughts. The paucity of 
documentary evidence has subsequently driven historians to speculation rather than 
analysis as to what role, if any, Dispatch no. 10 had on George Washington's 
announcement that he intended to sign Jay's Treaty the day after being handed 
Pickering's translation of the French dispatch. Edmund Randolph initiated the speculative 
trend when he identified Washington's change of mind during the summer of 1795 in 
Vindication. Randolph published Washington's letter of 22 July stating that he would 
never ratify Jay's Treaty during the existence of the provision order and compared that 
with the final language of the memorial the president dictated after the 12 August cabinet 
meeting which merely protested the existence of the provision order but did not make it a 
condition of ratification. Edmund Randolph's own conclusion publicly addressed directly 
to Washington was "that the immediate ratification of the treaty with Great Britain 
[could] be traced to no other source, than a surrender of yourself to the first impressions 
36
 Conway, Omitted Chapters, 282. 
37
 Freeman (Carroll and Ashworth), First in Peace, 280. 
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from the letter, which instantaneously governed you with respect to the instrument and 
myself."38 
The severe postal delays and loss of communication between the chief executive 
and his cabinet had deprived Randolph of Washington's letters of 29 and 31 July, 1795, 
indicating that he intended to revise the memorial and ratification until just days before 
the president's arrival in Philadelphia. Randolph's first meeting with Washington in 
which they might have discussed Washington's change of position was curtailed by 
Pickering's interruption. From Randolph's perspective Washington's announcement to 
ratify Jay's Treaty the day after their abbreviated dinner meeting appeared "immediate." 
Although by the time Randolph published Vindication he was well aware of the 
deleterious effects of the postal delays he did not address the possibility that signing the 
treaty to quell the "unsettled nature" of things during a crisis of public unrest was why 
Washington had abruptly returned to Philadelphia or what Washington had meant by a 
need for a "conjunct revision." 
Subsequent histories of this event have echoed Randolph's conclusions, but with 
unique speculative arguments. In their biography of Washington, Carroll and Ashworth 
created two pages of fiction speculating that Washington may have poured over Dispatch 
no. 10 the night of 11 August, "alone in his study, late that evening," agonizing over the 
implications of Randolph's guilt or innocence and analyzing Dispatch no. 10 paragraph 
by paragraph. Carroll and Ashworth described the president as "agitated by the natural, 
unbridled speculations that follow a great shock," and postulated that "not since the first 
fragmentary hints of Benedict Arnold's defection came to him had Washington faced this 
kind of thing." His biographers implied that Washington's suspicions of betrayal by a 
38
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71 
trusted friend in Randolph may have reminded him of Arnold's betrayal of his personal 
trust, in addition to treason, and concluded that "contemplations like these prompted 
Washington to summon the four members of the cabinet to his office the next morning, 
August 12."39 However, the cabinet meeting of 12 August was a logical and planned 
event for a president and cabinet that had been out of touch for nearly two weeks and not 
an emotional reaction to reading Dispatch no. 10.40 As well respected biographers of 
George Washington, Carroll and Ashworth were certainly well qualified to speculate 
about Washington's reaction to Dispatch no. 10, but they had no factual way of knowing 
anything about how George Washington spent his evening, what he thought about or how 
he reached his decisions. Taken to the opposite extreme, there is no actual evidence that 
Washington even read dispatch no. 10 in the twelve hours between being handed 
Pickering's translation and his announcement to settle the issue of ratification, which has 
been demonstrated, was "the primary cause of [his] return to Philadelphia."41 
James Thomas Flexner similarly romanticized Washington's unknown private 
moments after receiving Dispatch no. 10. by creating a scene in which "Washington's 
mind strained painfully" with "thoughts that wounded Washington's personal emotions." 
Flexner reiterated Carroll and Ashworth's Benedict Arnold theme of personal betrayal by 
Freeman (Carroll and Ashworth), First in Peace, 284,285. Within the chapter "Randolph or the Treaty" 
two short essays are inserted separately; "A Tragedy of Consequences," opposite page 287, and "Pickering 
and Wolcott: History Must Judge Them," opposite page 288, each dealing with Randolph's dismissal. 
40
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 George Washington to the Secretary of State, Mount Vernon, 29 July 1795, in Fitzpatrick, Writings. 
Washington's papers at the State Department include a "minute and extended summary" of Vindication 
annotated in Washington's handwriting .Conway, Omitted Chapters, 346. There is no doubt that 
Washington read Dispatch no. 10, and there is evidence that he analyzed it at length after it was published 
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dispatch for the first time. Washington may have read it in the twelve hours between his receipt of the 
translation and the 12 August cabinet meeting, however there is an equal possibility that he did not read 
Dispatch no. 10 until after the cabinet meeting while the ratification paperwork was being finalized. 
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a man, "whom he had up until that moment trusted and greatly admired." Flexner's 
narrative went on to describe how Washington, "in the loneliness of the dark and silent 
house, concluded that he would have to follow the advice of the senate exactly as given," 
hopelessly obscuring the fact that Washington had previously stated this position in his 
22 July letter to the Secretary of State, long before the fateful night of 11 August 1795. 
As with earlier biographies, Flexner embellished his account with events which were 
likely to have taken place but not founded on factual evidence. Flexner similarly 
concluded that Washington determined to sign Jay's Treaty that night out of the fear that 
he had been "following the advice of an advisor whom he now had reason to suspect of 
being in the pay of France."43 
Edmund Randolph's earliest biographer, Moncure Daniel Conway, claimed that 
"Washington... did not believe one word of the charges against Randolph." Conway 
believed that Dispatch no. 10 was "brought from the British office to be held as a pistol at 
the head of the administration to compel an unconditional signature to the treaty," and 
that "from the moment in which the intercepted dispatch was laid before him, every step 
of the president was compulsory." Although Conway separated Washington's decision 
from the question of Randolph's fate, he still concluded that Washington determined to 
sign Jay's treaty as a reaction to receiving Dispatch no. 10 the night before.44 
Historians of the Federalist Era have also reiterated the belief that Washington 
signed Jay's Treaty in reaction to Dispatch no. 10. John C. Miller noted that Randolph's 
"intrigue with the French minister" was more proof to Washington that French influence 
in the United States was strong and potentially within his own cabinet. Elkins and 
42
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McKitrick fictionalized their account of this event by imagining the ponderous 
considerations which "hovered in the very air as Washington sat down on the night of 
August 11, 1795 to read Dispatch Number 10...," and proposed that "we might read it 
with him." They concluded that Washington wished to sign the treaty because "it now 
seemed clear that Randolph's advice was not disinterested.. .He was now determined to 
be rid of Randolph once and for all.. ."45 However, Washington left no evidence of what 
he thought of Randolph at this moment. 
In his history of The Jay Treaty, Gerald Combs remained faithful to the evidence 
and concluded Washington's "loss of confidence in the veracity and loyalty of Randolph 
was the major cause of his reversal of position and determination to ratify immediately." 
Mary K. Bonsteel Tachau strenuously defended the reputation of Edmund Randolph but 
concluded along with others that "within twenty-four hours of reading [dispatch no. 10], 
Washington repudiated the strategy regarding Jay's Treaty that he and Randolph had 
agreed on a month earlier.. .Instead, he announced that he would sign immediately."4 
There are scholars who have argued that President Washington signed Jay's 
Treaty for the sole reason that it was in the best interest of the country, and not because of 
his exposure to Dispatch no. 10. Washington's first biographer, Chief Justice of the 
Supreme Court John Marshall, was a Virginia peer of both Washington and Randolph 
who was politically active during the time period in question. Justice Marshall's 1807 
account depicted the summer of 1795 as full of civil unrest and political protests. 
Working from Washington's original manuscripts and his own personal experience, 
Marshall claimed that "The President was most likely determined to the immediate 
45
 Miller, The Federalist Era, 169-171; Elkins and McKitrick, The Age of Federalism, All', 429. 
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adoption of this measure [ratification] by the extreme violence with which the treaty was 
exposed [public demonstrations and civil unrest], and the rapid progress the violence was 
making.. .It had become necessary to either attempt a diminution of its action by 
rendering its exertion hopeless, and by giving to the treaty the weight of his character and 
influence, or to yield to it." Although Marshall acknowledged Randolph's resignation as 
Secretary of State, he did not mention Dispatch no. 10. The only reason Marshall offered 
for Washington's decision to sign Jay's Treaty was to resolve civil unrest by making a 
definitive decision.47 
A modern defender of Edmund Randolph, Brian R. Zwilling, attempted to explain 
the "Puzzling Imprudence of George Washington," in a 1996 Master's thesis at Harvard 
University. Zwilling agreed with Conway that Washington's decision to sign Jay's Treaty 
had nothing to do with Randolph's guilt or innocence. Without citing Washington's 
correspondence that would have supported his theory, Zwilling concluded that regardless 
of the public outcry, congressional debate and partisan pressure, the president believed 
that Jay's Treaty would help ensure America's neutrality and therefore decided upon the 
ratification because it was in the best interest of the country without regard to Dispatch 
no. 10.48 
The preponderance of historiography concerning George Washington's decision 
to sign Jay's Treaty during the existence of the provision order that he considered an 
impediment to good relations with Great Britain has traditionally been told through the 
lens of Edmund Randolph's demise via the revelation of Dispatch no. 10. This trend was 
begun by Randolph's Vindication and has been perpetuated in the American memory by 
47
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48
 Zwilling, "The Puzzling Imprudence of George Washington," 65. 
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Washington's biographers, historians of the Federalist Era, Jay's Treaty, and most of 
Randolph's defenders. Yet Washington's receipt of Dispatch no. 10 upon his arrival in 
Philadelphia was merely a matter of timing and a function of his first personal contact 
with Secretaries Pickering and Wolcott after they had come into possession of Dispatch 
no. 10. The president's announcement the next morning that he had decided to take 
definitive action on Jay's Treaty at a cabinet meeting specifically planned for that 
purpose is hardly surprising. The coincidence in time of the two events created the 
illusion that they were related as cause and effect; a misconception that has taken hold in 
the American memory. 
Washington's own words show quite clearly that the president had determined to 
return to Philadelphia long before the cabinet ever summoned him, a summons he did not 
receive until he was packed and waiting for the weather to break to make his planned 
departure. George Washington's correspondence reveals that he had a clear picture of the 
domestic and international political landscape as well as a keen awareness of the perils 
and benefits for the nation which hinged upon his ratification or refusal of Jay's Treaty. 
Prior to the 12 August cabinet meeting the treaty had awaited only the president's 
signature or rejection for seven weeks, during which civil unrest and political opposition 
ran rampant. President Washington's correspondence expressed his awareness of the fact 
that the apparent indecision of the supreme magistrate only exacerbated national 
instability and required his decisive action. 
Acknowledging Washington's well thought out decision matrix and ponderous, 
though deliberate decisiveness in a time of national crisis is better aligned with the 
traditional memory of George Washington than the suggestion that he was swayed on a 
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matter of national security by the intrigues of foreign diplomats. Acknowledging the fact 
that George Washington signaled his decision to ratify Jay's Treaty through his 
correspondence while at Mount Vernon, long before he was aware of Dispatch no. 10, 
deflates a long held myth in the history of the early republic. Clarifying this seemingly 
small point provides a more accurate depiction of the events of the turbulent summer of 
1795. Divorcing the history of Dispatch no. 10 from Washington's ratification of Jay's 
Treaty allows historians to reinsert George Washington into the ratification of Jay's 
Treaty as a well informed, engaged president rather than a reactionary, aging old man 
recoiling from the betrayal of an old friend. Separating the two stories also allows us to 
fully appreciate the true history of Dispatch no. 10 and Edmund Randolph. 
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Chapter III 
A Presidential Affair of Honor 
Why did President Washington treat his Secretary of State with such asperity? 
George Washington was handed Dispatch no. 10, which implicated the Secretary of State 
in treasonous activity with the French minister to the United States, by Randolph's fellow 
cabinet members and political enemies, Secretary of the Treasury Oliver Wolcott and 
Secretary of War Timothy Pickering. Yet regardless of whether or not the dispatch 
caused the president to question the integrity of his Secretary of State or had any 
influence over Washington's decision to ratify Jay's Treaty in August, 1795, he kept the 
existence of the dispatch secret from Secretary of State Randolph for a full week while 
Jay's Treaty was prepared for ratification. The day after the treaty was signed 
Washington entrapped Randolph in an ambush which humiliated him in front of his 
cabinet rivals and political enemies, resulting in Randolph's immediate resignation and 
permanent departure from public office. Did George Washington believe that his protege 
was guilty of treasonable corruption? Did Washington realize all along that Randolph 
was innocent, but felt compelled politically to sacrifice him? Could Washington's actions 
have been meant to save Randolph? 
Unfortunately, the fact that George Washington left no record of his personal 
feelings regarding the Randolph affair has lead to centuries of speculation. In the 1990s 
Brian Zwilling found Washington's behavior to be uncharacteristically rude as he sought 
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answers to "The Puzzling Imprudence of George Washington."1 Randolph's defenders 
have similarly faulted Washington's behavior. Mary K. Bonsteel-Tachau concluded that 
"Washington ought to have known [Randolph] better," and accused Washington of 
acquiescing to "the sacrifice of Randolph's reputation in order to preserve his own." 
Irving Brandt identified "the ease with which Washington's intense integrity was 
imposed upon by the malevolence of Pickering and Wolcott," as one of the "bizarre 
injustices with which Randolph's reputation was done to death."3 
Washington's biographers have attempted to explain Washington's behavior 
while choosing between "Randolph or the Treaty" during a "War with an Old Friend." 
Carroll and Ashworth theorized that Washington's harsh interview of 19 August was 
meant to distill Randolph's innocence or guilt by interpreting his physical and emotional 
reaction to being shown Dispatch no. 10. James Thomas Flexner later advanced Carroll 
and Ashworth's theory with an elaborate explanation of Washington's painful memory of 
Benedict Arnold's betrayal and of Washington's determination to judge Randolph by his 
behavior during the inquisition.4 
The biographies of Randolph and Washington are essential to understanding the 
events of August 1795. Because Randolph was politically disgraced and essentially 
written out of history by the federalists of the early republic, few historians consider 
Edmund Randolph's life prior to his cabinet years. Yet his lifelong relationship with 
George Washington is at the very heart of explaining the actions of both George 
Washington and Edmund Randolph over Dispatch no. 10. 
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The recent scholarship of Joanne Freeman which examined Affairs of Honor as 
they affected National Politics in the New Republic has enabled modern researchers to 
more accurately interpret George Washington and Edmund Randolph's tragic struggle. 
The ambush of 19 August set in motion a classic affair of honor between the president of 
the United States and his highest ranking cabinet member. When their long interpersonal 
relationship is inserted into the affair it becomes intensely personal. This was not only an 
affair of honor between two of the most socially prominent men in America; it was a 
family struggle between two men whose close relationship made it a veritable affair of 
honor between father and son. Placing Washington and Randolph's debacle within the 
framework of an affair of honor clarifies Washington's puzzling imprudence by making it 
possible to interpret his actions and words through the lens of eighteenth-century political 
America. George Washington may have intentionally chosen to initiate an affair of honor 
out of respect for Edmund Randolph in a heroic effort to salvage his adopted son's 
personal reputation and to preserve Randolph's career. 
George Washington was a long time family friend to the Randolphs of Virginia. 
Washington served in Virginia's provincial House of Burgesses with Edmund's father 
John, and his uncle Peyton Randolph, from 1758 until the advent of the Revolutionary 
War.6 Moncure Daniel Conway characterized Edmund's uncle, Peyton Randolph, as 
"probably the most intimate friend Washington ever had," leaving little doubt that the 
two prominent Virginia families were close. George Washington would therefore have 
known Edmund Randolph since Edmund was a child. 
5
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As hostility erupted into violence in 1775, Edmund's father John Randolph, the 
last royal attorney general of Virginia, chose to remain loyal to the crown and joined the 
fleeing royal governor of Virginia by moving his entire family to England. However, 
Edmund Randolph chose Virginia and America over family and crown and remained in 
America. Edmund Randolph was literally orphaned at the age of twenty-one by his 
loyalist father who left behind only a legacy of debt which would haunt Edmund for the 
rest of his life. Edmund was temporarily fostered by his otherwise childless uncle, Peyton 
o 
Randolph, who had mentored Edmund throughout his youth. 
Edmund sought an appointment to serve with General Washington at Cambridge 
during the summer of 1775, in hopes that proving his loyalty to America through military 
service would dispel any aspersions cast by his "aristocratic father's toryism." With the 
patronage of his prominent uncle and other Virginians serving in the Continental 
Congress, Edmund Randolph was appointed an aide-de-camp to General Washington on 
15 August 1775. Washington fully appreciated Randolph's patriotic dilemma and 
welcomed him into the "military family" where he handled Washington's 
correspondence.10 
Edmund's uncle, Peyton Randolph, passed away unexpectedly while serving as 
president of the Continental Congress in October 1775, leaving young Edmund Randolph 
once again without adult male patronage. Randolph left General Washington's 
Cambridge headquarters in November to return his uncle's body to Virginia and to care 
in Washington's diaries between 1753 and 1775 depicting political, financial and social interaction between 
Washington and John Randolph and his family as well as between Washington and Peyton Randolph 
(Washington, Diaries of George Washington). 
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for his widowed aunt. According to John Reardon, Edmund's visible display of loyalty to 
Virginia and the revolution achieved its goal, for "without question, his service to 
Washington removed all doubt about his support for the rebellion."11 During Edmund's 
delay in Williamsburg to attend to his uncle's estate he was welcomed home by the 
powerful political families of Virginia. 
Edmund Randolph was appointed as a judge in the admiralty court of Virginia by 
the Virginia Convention of Delegates in January 1776, making it impossible to return to 
Washington's side, but validating Edmund's "loyalty and position as a patriot." Randolph 
was elected to the Virginia Convention of Delegates in April 1776, and immediately after 
the Constitution of Virginia was adopted Randolph was elected as the first attorney 
general of Virginia, essentially succeeding to the post abandoned by his father, the last 
royal attorney general. For the remainder of the Revolutionary War Randolph served as 
attorney general to Virginia and alternately served in the Virginia House of Delegates or 
the Continental Congress as a representative from Virginia. As a key figure in both 
Virginia and national politics, Randolph's continued correspondence with his former 
commander throughout the war provided Washington with valuable political insights. 
At the end of the Revolutionary War Edmund Randolph became George 
Washington's personal attorney, a post he held until their dramatic separation in 1795. 
Randolph discretely handled all of Washington's legal affairs from land speculation deals 
in the Ohio to the evictions of derelict tenants, placing both men in frequent intimate 
contact for over a decade. As their new relationship began Randolph expressed his 
gratitude to Washington for his "repeated acts of friendship" by refusing to accept any 
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legal fees in "the usual way lawyers give some small testimony of their attachment." 
Randolph continued to refer to his "attachment" to Washington throughout their 
correspondence for the next twelve years, clearly indicating his loyalty and possibly 
suggesting that he had adopted Washington as a surrogate father figure.14 As a peer of 
Randolph's father and uncle, Washington's age difference with Randolph created a 
natural parent-child relationship. 
The passing of Edmund Randolph's beloved aunt, Elizabeth Randolph, in 
February, 1783, set in motion a legal and financial maelstrom. Peyton Randolph's will 
stipulated that all land and property passed to his wife Elizabeth until her death, when 
they devolved to his brother, Edmund's father, John Randolph. Yet John Randolph the 
loyalist had departed Virginia in 1775 with numerous unpaid debts. From the moment of 
Elizabeth Randolph's passing, Edmund was hounded by his absentee father's creditors. 
John Randolph passed away in England the following January, 1784, leaving Edmund 
with an entangled estate of debt and creditors that he spent the rest of his life settling. 
Randolph's struggle to balance his uncle's estates with his father's debts compelled 
Randolph to earn a living to support his family, a difficult compromise for a public 
servant in the early republic. Edmund Randolph's infamous struggle with his family's 
debt eventually left him vulnerable to the charges of bribery alleged in Dispatch no. 10 
and unfit for public office.15 
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After the war, Washington ostensibly retired from public office to manage his 
affairs at Mount Vernon while Edmund Randolph remained active in Virginia politics. In 
November 1786 Randolph was elected governor of Virginia. As Randolph assumed the 
executive position, his former commander-in-chief congratulated "his Excellency, 
Edmund Randolph," on his appointment as the "chief magistrate of the commonwealth." 
Washington's endorsement of "his Excellency" glowed; "As no one seems more fully 
impressed with the necessity of adopting measures than yourself, no one is better 
qualified to be entrusted with the reins of government."1 Washington and Randolph's 
roles with respect to political power also appeared reversed when Randolph's continued 
activity within Virginia politics eventually elevated him to Grand Master of the Virginia 
Free-Masons, 1784-1788. As Grand Master of Virginia, Randolph founded the 
i -i 
Alexandria Lodge, and installed George Washington as its first master. 
As governor of Virginia, Edmund Randolph pleaded with Washington to attend 
the Constitutional Convention scheduled for May, 1787, in Philadelphia. Randolph had 
attended the abortive Annapolis Convention as Virginia's attorney general and was 
keenly aware of the need for credibility which would be gained by the presence of 
George Washington in Philadelphia. Randolph blandished Washington by naming him 
first on the list of delegates in deference to his social preeminence. Even though named 
ahead of the governor of his state, Washington continually refused to attend. Governor 
Randolph eventually called upon Washington's friendship when he made his final plea. 
1 R 
In April 1787, Washington begrudgingly accepted his state's appointment. Many 
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prominent founders encouraged Washington to attend the Philadelphia Convention 
making it naive to solely credit Edmund Randolph with convincing Washington to attend. 
However, as Virginia's most prominent politician with a legitimate claim to personal 
friendship, Randolph certainly contributed to coaxing Washington out of retirement. 
Following President Washington's inauguration in 1789 he extended an offer to 
his personal lawyer to serve as his attorney general. When he made the offer Washington 
acknowledged the financial distress created by the absentee indebtedness of Randolph's 
loyalist father by reassuring him that although "the salary of this office appears to be 
fixed," he believed that "the station would confer pre-eminence on it possessor, and 
produce for him a decided preference of professional employment." As a friend and peer 
of Randolph's father and uncle, and through their frequent personal contact after the war, 
Washington was well aware that Randolph had been balancing public service in Virginia 
with his more lucrative private practice in order to meet his family's financial needs 
while settling his father's substantial debts. It appears that Washington therefore hoped to 
entice Randolph into federal service with the lure of an improved private practice based 
upon a pedigree as Attorney General of the United States. Randolph's acceptance of the 
position included a candid and detailed accounting of his financial distress.1 There were 
no secrets between these men. 
The role of attorney general and legal advisor to the president was critical to 
navigating the myriad questions raised while creating a new government under the new 
federal constitution. As a key participant in the Constitutional Convention and an untiring 
champion of the constitution's ratification, former attorney general and one of the most 
19
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prominent lawyers in Virginia, Edmund Randolph was well prepared to provide the 
president with sound legal advice. 
Edmund Randolph was instrumental in establishing many of the precedents in the 
early republic. For example, upon becoming Attorney General of the United States, 
Randolph's first challenge was to provide congress with a report on the Judiciary Act of 
1789, in which he specifically defined the relationship of the attorney general to the 
judicial districts.20 Later, in 1791, Randolph provided guidance to the governors of 
Virginia and Pennsylvania for the procedural extradition of fugitives between the states, 
though he refused to actually become involved in the matter for fear of setting an 
undesirable precedent as federal mediator between state's disputes. When George 
Washington was faced with the prospect of using his first veto over a congressional bill 
he turned to Randolph, Jefferson and Madison for constitutional guidance. The 
unanimous decision of this committee was that the formula proposed in the 
Apportionment Bill of 26 March 1792, was un-constitutional and required the president's 
veto. Randolph presented Washington with a draft veto message citing the 
inconsistencies which Washington utilized verbatim when he invoked the first 
presidential veto under the U.S. Constitution.21 
As Alexander Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson became increasingly adversarial 
and cabinet meetings became more contentious, Randolph emerged as the mediator of the 
middle ground. For example, when the French Revolution turned violent and France 
declared war in Europe in 1793, George Washington was determined that the United 
States remain neutral. His cabinet generally agreed with Washington, although "Hamilton 
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favored an immediate declaration of neutrality," while Jefferson sought to gain 
concessions from the British for U.S. neutrality and objected to the word "neutrality." 
When Edmund Randolph was assigned the task of writing Washington's neutrality 
proclamation, Randolph created a document which defined the legal implications of 
neutrality and stated the president's policy without actually using the word "neutrality," 
satisfying Hamilton and Jefferson in both spirit and verbiage. Randolph's draft was 
approved unanimously by the cabinet and signed by Washington the same day, 22 April 
1793, without changes.22 
Randolph's service to the president was more than professional. It was also 
personal and even filial. John Reardon observed that whenever Washington was out of 
town throughout the 1780s and early 1790s, Edmund and Betsy Randolph "saw to it that 
Mrs. Washington had their companionship by dining with her on occasion as old 
friends."23 When yellow fever struck Philadelphia in September 1793, Randolph feared 
for the president's health and personally arranged quarters for Washington in 
Germantown as they discussed the practical and constitutional implications of convening 
congress outside of Philadelphia to avoid the fever. 4 During the Whiskey Rebellion 
Randolph remained at the seat of government as Washington rode out with the militia in 
October 1794. During Washington's absence Randolph dutifully handled the daily 
correspondence of the government and posted daily intelligence updates to the president 
while "Mrs. Washington became accustomed to almost daily visits from the Secretary of 
State."25 Edmund Randolph's doting upon the Washingtons at the very least perpetuated 
22
 Reardon, Edmund Randolph, 221, 223. 
23
 Reardon, Edmund Randolph, 201. 
24
 Conway, Omitted Chapters, 154, and Reardon, Edmund Randolph, 240, 241. 
25
 Reardon, Edmund Randolph, 276. 
87 
the inter-family relationship of respect he had observed between his parents, his uncle 
and the Washington's as a child. Taken to an extreme, Randolph's behavior was that of a 
dutiful child, furthering his surrogate relationship with Washington. 
George Washington reciprocated Randolph's familial gestures with paternal 
behavior. Although Washington had no children of his own, throughout his life 
Washington "adopted" several talented, devoted and loyal men, each in need of surrogate 
parental role models. When Washington married the recently widowed Martha 
Dandridge-Custis in 1759 he adopted both of her surviving children, including her five 
year old son, John Parke-Custis. Washington's loving correspondence to his legally 
adopted step-son included advice on business, relationships, military service, and politics 
and reveals a deeply authentic paternal bond. John Parke Custis followed Washington's 
advice and pursued public service in the Virginia House of Delegates during the 
Revolutionary War. Custis finally served his step-father at the siege of Yorktown as a 
civilian aide-de-camp, but tragically succumbed to a camp fever and died shortly 
afterwards at the age of twenty-seven. George and Martha Washington adopted two of 
John Parke-Custis' four children, including his infant son, George Washington Parke 
Custis, whom they raised as their own. 
Washington famously adopted his Revolutionary War companion, the Marquis de 
Lafayette. Lafayette's father was killed in battle before his birth, and his mother passed 
away when he was just fourteen, making him an aristocratic orphan at a young age. 
Although Washington distrusted and discouraged the barrage of young European 
aristocrats clamoring for fame or glory in the burgeoning conflict with Great Britain, 
Lafayette distinguished himself by suffering with the army at Valley Forge, and being 
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wounded in battle. At the conclusion of the War General Washington ceremonially 
"adopted" Lafayette as each man pledged their fidelity to the other. During the 1790s, 
while Lafayette was held as a political prisoner during the French Revolution, George 
Washington repaid his "son's" loyalty by working for his release, sending money to his 
embattled wife and raising their son, George Washington Lafayette, in America where he 
would be safe from persecution or the guillotine. After Lafayette's release from prison he 
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thanked his "beloved General...the adoptive father of the whole family." 
George Washington appears to have also tacitly adopted his longest serving and 
most faithful servant, the physically and spiritually abandoned Edmund Randolph. 
Randolph's role as Washington's attorney kept the two men in constant contact after the 
Revolution. Washington reciprocated Randolph's untiring devotion by including the 
financially strapped Randolph in the potentially lucrative land speculation of the Potomac 
River and James River Companies, where Reardon observed that Washington "served as 
Randolph's principal informant on activities of the Potomac River Company," while 
Randolph served as a director of the James River Company and exercised Washington's 
proxy.27 Notably, Edmund and Betsy Randolph were only able to dote upon Mrs. 
Washington throughout the 1780s and early 1790s because of their particularly close 
relationship which allowed them familial rather than social access. 
The correspondence between Washington and Randolph provides a semblance of 
documentary evidence of their familial relationship. Eighteenth-century correspondence 
between adult males was polite if nothing else. Joanne Freeman observed that words had 
powerful implications politically and socially, therefore correspondents chose their words 
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carefully even in personal communications. Notably, correspondence of the eighteenth-
century closed with a flourish of obeisance which signified the social relationship 
between the two correspondents. A mere signature without any flourish implied a social 
snub or even an insult. However, the most common element found in nearly all closings 
consisted of; "your most obedient servant." Even General Wayne and the besieged 
commandant of Fort Miamis politely (or sarcastically) closed their letters with this phrase 
at the climax of the Battle of Fallen Timbers.29 The next most common closing added an 
embellishment; "your most obedient and humble servant," which appears in official 
correspondence as well as personal letters between non-intimate writers.30 
The closer the social relationship between two correspondents the more 
embellished the closing flourish, such as "with regard and affection I am your most 
obedient and humble servant," or "with very great esteem I am your most obedient and 
humble servant." Edmund Randolph's closings to Washington in the early 1780s 
reflected his debt of gratitude to Washington for allowing him to prove his patriotism 
with the army at Cambridge: "Believe me to be, my dear Sir, to be with the sincerest 
affection, to be your most humble and obliged servant," or "with the most sincere 
affection, your most obliged humble servant." Near the end of their relationship 
Randolph's closings reflected his filial attachment to Washington: "I have the honor to 
Freeman, Affairs of Honor, 113, 114. 
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be, my dear Sir, with the utmost cordial and grateful attachment, your affectionate and 
humble servant," or "I have the honor to be Sir, with the most respectful and affectionate 
attachment, your most obedient servant."32 
George Washington's letters covered a wide gamut between official political or 
business correspondence to personal letters between family and friends and therefore 
utilized the entire spectrum of signature flourishes. Washington incorporated a unique 
block to his unofficially adopted son, the Marquis de Lafayette. Each letter to Lafayette 
began; "My Dear Marquis..." Embedded within each signature flourish to Lafayette the 
phrase was repeated: "With the greatest sincerity, I am, my Dear Marquis," or "With the 
greatest attachment and the most unalterable affection, I am, My Dear Marquis, your 
most obedient servant," accentuating Washington's paternal "attachment."33 
Washington's most intimate closings were to his adopted step-son, John Parke 
Custis: "Sincerely and affectionately, I am yours."34 In all of Washington's 
correspondence the closing phrase "I am yours," or simply "yours" appears rarely and 
only to his closest friends or family, such as his step-son, occasionally to Alexander 
Hamilton and even more rarely to Thomas Jefferson. Washington's simplest signature 
block implied his deepest attachment. Washington's closings to Randolph were 
embellished with close personal closings as early as the Revolutionary War: "With regard 
and affection, Sir, I am your most obedient and humble servant." Near the end of their 
relationship Washington's signature blocks to Randolph resembled those to his deceased 
32
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step-son: "Sincerely and affectionately I am yours," or "I am always, yours." One of his 
last letters to Randolph during the 1795 postal debacle at Mount Vernon, just prior to 
their fateful separation, closed; "I am always, yours affectionately." 
George Washington's frequent use of his most intimate signature flourish when 
writing to Randolph implies that Randolph was held in a similar, though not necessarily 
equal regard to Washington's actual step-son or his ceremonially adopted son, the 
Marquis de Lafayette. All three men were born between 1753 and 1757 which made 
Washington, born in 1732, an appropriate age to have been their father. The bond 
between George Washington and Edmund Randolph transcended their various military, 
political, social, and professional relationships. Edmund Randolph's immediate family 
orphaned him in America as a young man lacking fraternal guidance or support. Childless 
George Washington was a strong male role model who willingly fostered capable, 
dedicated, loyal young men. It appears that George Washington and Edmund Randolph 
forged a de facto father-son relationship during their twenty years of service to each 
other. Appreciating the closeness of their relationship is instrumental to understanding the 
events of the summer of 1795. 
George Washington arrived in Philadelphia 11 August, 1795 to resolve national 
tension over the un-ratified Jay Treaty. As the nation teetered on the brink of war with 
either Great Britain or France, and as political faction tore at the republican spirit of the 
early republic, Washington was presented with the intercepted Dispatch no. 10 which 
implicated his most faithful friend and servant in potentially treasonous activity. 
George Washington to Edmund Randolph 11 October 1794 and 18 October 1794, in George Washington 
Papers. 
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Most historians agree that Washington withheld the incriminating dispatch for 
eight days before confronting Randolph in the interest of national security. Washington 
needed to conclude the ratification of Jay's Treaty quickly to settle growing civil unrest. 
Yet Washington's decision to ratify Jay's Treaty during the existence of the odious 
provision order and the seizures of U.S. shipping required a new memorial to the British 
government which merely protested the provision order but did not require its removal as 
a condition of ratification. In order to re-write the memorial before George Hammond's 
departure for London on 15 August, just three days after Washington reversed his 
position and announced his intention to ratify Jay's Treaty, the president needed 
Secretary of State Randolph's complete cooperation. 
Moncure Daniel Conway suggested that Washington specifically wanted 
Randolph to write the new memorial because he wanted a "non-British sympathizer to 
T O 
write his remonstrance to set the tone." Most historians also agree that if Washington 
had confronted Randolph in the midst of preparing the memorial or the treaty that he 
would have reacted just as he eventually did; resigned on the spot and published Dispatch 
no. 10. Not only would George Hammond have returned to London without news of the 
treaty or its prospects for ratification, an abrupt departure from office by the Secretary of 
State could have doomed the ratification and further enraged partisan political dissent. 
Washington had to wait until the necessary paperwork was completed or risk political 
chaos and the potential loss of Jay's Treaty.39 
After Jay's Treaty was signed and safely delivered, Washington was faced with 
several options for dealing with Dispatch no. 10 and Edmund Randolph. To Randolph's 
38
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enemies the contents of the dispatch implied that he had met with Citizen Fauchet during 
the Whiskey Rebellion and that, "for some thousands of dollars," his influence "over the 
mid of the president," could have been bought to decide upon "civil war or peace," 
allegedly at the discretion of the French Republic. If true, Randolph would have been 
guilty of "treasonable corruption," for soliciting a bribe from a foreign government to 
influence the performance of his duties to the United States.40 
The president could have preferred formal charges of treason against Randolph. 
Few historians would disagree that if George Washington had believed that there was 
actual evidence of treason, or any violation of the rule of law, he would have charged 
Randolph and prosecuted him without hesitation regardless of their background. It is 
simply not believable that Washington would not have followed the law precisely if there 
had been any actual evidence of a crime. But Dispatch no. 10 was far from unequivocal 
evidence. The dispatch was written by the French minister, a man Washington disliked 
and never trusted. Dispatch no. 10 was conveniently provided by the British government 
with uncanny timing at the zenith of national tension created by debate over a treaty 
widely regarded as favorable to Great Britain. George Washington must have recognized 
that the weakness of the evidence would not support legal charges. Edmund Randolph 
was therefore never charged or prosecuted for any activity related to the contents of 
Dispatch no. 10. 
At the other extreme, Washington could have chosen to do nothing at all. 
However, ignoring the dispatch entirely would not have satisfied the British Foreign 
Ministry, whose stated agenda was the removal of Randolph from office. Stung by the 
Secretary of State's forceful diplomacy in defense of U.S. sovereignty in 1794, Lord 
40
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Grenville, the British Secretary for Foreign Affairs, had specifically forwarded Dispatch 
no. 10 to George Hammond for the purpose of "placing [Randolph] in a situation where 
his sentiments may not endanger the peace of two countries..." Without any sign of 
Randolph's removal from office or disciplinary action, his enemies would almost 
certainly have published Dispatch no. 10 to force the issue, which would have been 
problematic for Washington. The contents of Dispatch no. 10 were too inflammatory to 
be ignored. The dispatch exposed the Washington administration's internal bickering 
over the use of force in the Whiskey Rebellion, as well as the political chasm within his 
cabinet and "involved Washington as much as Randolph."41 Fauchet's narrative had 
depicted the president as either weak, or foolish or both. If Dispatch no. 10 had been 
published by Great Britain or any of Randolph's Federalist enemies without repudiation, 
it could have implied "executive intrigue with the French Republic causing damage to 
Washington's administration which could not be undone." Washington had to take 
action, if only to control the publication of the dispatch in the press.42 
The president could have had the civility to handle the matter of Dispatch no. 10 
privately with Randolph, allowing him the opportunity to explain himself or discreetly 
mount the credible defense he eventually presented in Vindication. Although showing 
Randolph such a courtesy would have been in keeping with the eighteenth-century code 
of honor, it would have given the outward appearance of inaction with identical 
consequences. 
Washington could have quietly moved Randolph to a seat on the Supreme Court, 
a move which had been hinted at by Rufus King, Aaron Burr, attorney general Bradford 
41
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and Randolph the previous month. Such a move might have satisfied his enemies' 
desire to remove Randolph form a position of direct influence on Washington by moving 
him into the judiciary while avoiding the appearance of the secretary of state's untimely 
removal from office. 
Unfortunately, whether or not Edmund Randolph was guilty or innocent, the 
allegations raised by Dispatch no. 10 accentuated Randolph's precarious fiscal situation. 
Randolph's perpetual maneuvering to appease his father's creditors was well known to 
his friends and others in government. Gordon Wood observed that "members of the 
learned professions were considered gentleman," and therefore lawyers were eligible for 
public service in the ideology of the early republic. However, public servants were 
expected to be impartial or disinterested and free from the market place in order to serve 
the public virtuously. Edmund Randolph's need to earn a living in order to support his 
family, maintain his estates, and settle his father's debts perpetually placed him in a 
questionable position as a public servant throughout his political career as he balanced his 
lucrative private practice concurrently with various public offices. The mere implication 
of fiscal misbehavior raised by Dispatch no. 10 tainted Randolph's public image to serve 
virtuously, finally rendering him unfit for further public service in the early republic, and 
ruled out a move to the bench of the Supreme Court.44 
George Washington was a keen politician and would have been well aware of his 
options and the consequence of each. In each scenario Edmund Randolph would be 
publicly humiliated by the ambiguous words of the French foreign minister, twisted in 
court or the press by Randolph's political enemies until Randolph's reputation was 
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ruined, which in eighteenth-century America would have meant that Randolph himself 
would be ruined. It appears that George Washington chose to provide his most faithful 
friend with a means of retaining his honor and reputation, while controlling or at least 
delaying the publication of Dispatch no. 10, by initiating an affair of honor with Edmund 
Randolph. The first President of the United States intentionally offended his Secretary of 
State, well aware of the outcome. 
George Washington's biographers agree that he was a master of theater and 
appearances. Nothing was ever left to chance; Washington always set the scene, the time 
and the venue.45 Therefore it is reasonable to conclude that Washington's actions during 
the eight days prior to his ambush of Edmund Randolph were calculated to achieve an 
outcome which he desired. 
Many historians have repeated Edmund Randolph's complaint that Washington 
"held frequent consultations with Messrs. Wolcott and Pickering," by citing a brief letter 
from Washington to "The Secretaries of the Treasury and War." There is no other 
evidence of Washington actually consulting with Wolcott or Pickering in person, but 
Washington's short note written during the week between 12 and 18 August, reveals 
Washington's plan. Washington began with procedural questions; "At what time should 
Mr. F—ts letter be made known to Mr. ~R? What will be the best mode of presenting it? 
If the explanations given... are not satisfactory, whether, besides removal, are any other 
measures proper to be taken? And what?" Washington then asked if they should first ask 
Mr. Adet for the pertinent paragraphs of the missing Dispatches no. 3 and no. 6, for they 
"might condemn or acquit unequivocally," and recognized that "if innocent whether R 
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will apply for them if I do not?" This simple question reveals that Washington was not in 
possession of Dispatches no. 3 or no. 6 as was assumed by historians prior to Jerald 
Combs, but he recognized that they were critical to deciphering Dispatch no. 10. The 
question also reveals that Washington knew Randolph well enough to know that he 
would demand access to the missing dispatches.46 
Washington's conclusion illuminated his plan, as he discussed the public reaction 
to "the removal of so high an Officer." Washington further displayed his thorough 
understanding of Edmund Randolph while invoking the language of an affair of honor 
when he explained that "it is not to be expected that the removed Officer, will acquiesce 
without attempting a justification." Washington then removed all doubt that he would 
have handled Randolph more harshly if he thought Randolph guilty and fully realized 
that an affair of honor would follow; "for if he is guilty of what he is charged, he merits 
no favor; and if he is not, he will accept none."47 
Although Washington's note ostensibly solicited input from the two other 
secretaries in his cabinet, it was actually his first act of theater. George Washington was 
too observant a politician to not have known that Wolcott and Pickering were Federalist 
enemies to Randolph. Washington would also have been well aware that Wolcott was not 
only a toady to Hamilton, but that he was close to George Hammond, as evidenced by his 
being the trusted conduit of Dispatch no. 10. Any correspondence to Wolcott and 
Pickering would surely be shared with Hamilton and Hammond. Therefore, 
Washington's discussion about the various modes and implications of Randolph's 
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removal appeased those working to that end and forestalled the publication of the 
inflammatory dispatch until he could set his own plan into action, after Jay's Treaty was 
safely concluded. 
Randolph, and his defenders, protested what they perceived as Washington's 
deceit during the week of 12 to 18 August. While Washington was in possession of 
Dispatch no. 10 he conducted business as usual in order to complete the treaty paperwork 
prior to Hammond's departure. During that week the president visited Randolph and his 
family at their home, as usual, without any hint that anything might be wrong. 
Washington also honored Randolph by placing him at the head of his table at dinner 
twice during the week, including the very night before the fateful ambush. Randolph 
cited Washington's behavior as a cruel hypocrisy; honoring a man he knew he was about 
to ruin. Conway thought Randolph a "man betrayed with a kiss."48 However, 
Washington's behavior was also that of a man saying good-bye before a permanent 
separation, with the dramatic irony that at the time only he knew it was farewell. His 
actions indicate that Washington was preparing for the affair of honor which he knew 
would cause irreparable harm to his long relationship with Randolph and the Randolph 
family. 
Timothy Zwilling concluded that George Washington "should not have been 
caught off guard by Randolph's resignation" after Washington's "uncharacteristically 
rude treatment" of Randolph on the morning of 19 August, 1795.49 Yet, it is not likely 
that Washington was caught off guard at all. As a master of social theater, it is more 
Randolph, Vindication, 50; Conway, Omitted Chapters, 353; Zwilling, "The Puzzling Imprudence of 
George Washington," 21. 
49
 Zwilling, "The Puzzling Imprudence of George Washington," 61. 
99 
likely that Washington carefully orchestrated every "uncharacteristically rude" gesture in 
order to incite Randolph to an affair of honor. 
The morning of 19 August 1795 began with Randolph being told via messenger 
that the scheduled cabinet meeting had been delayed from nine until half-passed ten, a lie 
to isolate Randolph and ensure that he would be the last to arrive. When Randolph 
arrived, alone, at the appointed hour, he was ushered into a room with a seated panel 
already convened, signaling his position as a man accused; a man alone; a man 
abandoned. Randolph immediately recognized the scene as a "military style...tribunal of 
inquiry."50 The president was careful not to make any accusations of his own, which 
would have been considered "giving the lie direct," the most harsh of all offenses in the 
code duello. Instead, he asked Randolph to read the original of Dispatch no. 10 and 
"make such explanations as you choose." The unstated implication of lying or deceptive 
activity was clear to Randolph, but Washington was careful to not to verbalize the 
charges. An affair of honor was nevertheless required to respond to "the indirect lie.""1 
When Washington insisted that Wolcott and Pickering question Randolph themselves, 
Oliver Wolcott only asked one inane question which Randolph "did not object to," 
while Timothy Pickering refused to pose any questions at all, lest either secretary hazard 
an affair of honor of their own. 
After Randolph's initial explanations, Washington was called from the room 
under the pretext of receiving routine paperwork. It seems unlikely that the president 
would have allowed any interruptions while accusing his secretary of state of treasonous 
activity. However, Washington's orchestrated absence from the room provided Randolph 
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a singular opportunity to informally converse with Wolcott and Pickering. Although 
Randolph did not glean any worthwhile information from them, he quickly deduced their 
role in the affair. 
Randolph's dismissal for forty-five minutes while the panel of inquiry deliberated 
was also in keeping with a military style tribunal, and signified that Randolph had been 
subordinated to his peers. The president and his secretaries did not reach a verdict during 
this deliberation, but Randolph was afforded the time he needed to assess the situation 
and formulate his plan to resign and defend himself. 
Joanne Freeman depicted the ritual steps to an eighteenth-century affair of 
honor and explained that "any mention of honor was a clear sign that [a man's] honor had 
been offended." Randolph's letter of resignation formally announced the affair of honor 
by stating that "the president...had consulted others upon a letter from a foreign minister, 
highly interesting to my honour..." and further conformed to the ritual by stating that he 
"would not.. .relinquish the inquiry." Randolph asked Washington to "acknowledge one 
piece of justice due on this occasion, which is that until an inquiry can be made, the affair 
shall continue in secrecy under your injunction."5 Randolph's request provided 
Washington with the perfect tool with which to control the publication of Dispatch no. 
10, for he was bound under the code of honor to "keep the affair secret," as requested by 
his opponent. None of the Federalist co-conspirators would dare to violate Washington's 
injunction during an affair of honor. Washington's plan had already yielded results. 
Edmund Randolph's actions following his resignation carried the affair of honor 
to what was in eighteenth-century American politics, a logical conclusion. George 
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Washington's social preeminence made him a difficult adversary. Edmund Randolph 
could not challenge Washington to mortal combat, as under the code "only social equals 
could duel," which made George Washington invulnerable.55 Randolph chose the next 
best weapon available to him, and one he was eminently qualified to wield; the defensive 
pamphlet. 
Joanne Freeman described defensive pamphlets as "signed, structured character 
defenses brimming with hard evidence," which were "legal briefs argued before the 
tribunal of one's peers." A defensive pamphlet was also "the best forum for an extended 
argument advanced with documentary evidence." Randolph's one-hundred and five page 
A Vindication of Mr. Randolph's Resignation, 1795, was a classic defensive pamphlet 
and a reaction to the interview of 19 August just as predictable to Washington as his 
resignation.56 Washington utilized the language of the duel and acknowledged the affair 
of honor in his final correspondence to Randolph when he referred to Randolph's 
pending "vindication to the public,"57 a ritual reference to Randolph's defense rather than 
the pending pamphlet's title. 
Randolph spent two months gathering affidavits and documentary evidence. As 
Washington had predicted, Randolph requested and received copies of the missing 
Dispatches no. 3 and no.6, as well as other state department correspondence. Most 
historians have noted that Washington took the unprecedented step of giving Randolph 
free license to publish any and all of their correspondence, even personal letters and 
conversations. However, interpreted within the framework of an affair of honor, 
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Washington's permission was given to Randolph only after Randolph had "posted" 
Washington by publishing an excerpt of an unfulfilled request for state department papers 
"needed for his defense." Washington was therefore compelled by the code of honor to 
give Randolph permission to "publish, without reserve, any and every private and 
confidential letter I ever wrote you;- nay more- every word I ever uttered to, or in your 
CO 
presence, from which you can derive any advantage in your vindication." The president 
could not risk any appearance of hindering his opponent's means of achieving justice. 
Carroll and Ashworth praised Randolph's defensive pamphlet as an "ironclad 
argument," which "omitted no evidence, misquoted no document, and committed no 
error," yet most twentieth-century accounts have criticized Randolph's Vindication. 
Irving Brandt, Randolph's first defender, described Vindication as "a mingled defense of 
himself and a political attack on Washington... the ineptness of which should have 
acquitted him." Mary K. Bonsteel-Tachau described Vindication as "incompetent," 
which, because of its "diatribe against Washington," failed to provide Randolph with the 
desired "vindication." Most agree that Randolph's intemperate language was impolite in 
the extreme and vitiated his defense while leaving Washington no room to save face or 
forgive Randolph if he had been convinced by Randolph's defensive argument.59 
Yet modern interpretations of Vindication fail to consider it as an eighteenth-
century defense in an affair of honor. Joanne Freeman observed that because of their 
aggressive tone and caustic vocabulary, "early national pamphlets have been [widely] 
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misinterpreted as petty personal diatribes." However, in the words of Randolph's 
eighteenth-century contemporaries, Vindication achieved its goal. After Vindication was 
published, Thomas Jefferson declared Randolph's narrative "so straight and plain that 
even those who did not know him will acquit him of the charge of bribery. Those who 
know him had done it from the first." Randolph's best friend, James Madison, wrote to 
Jefferson that "His greatest enemies will not easily persuade themselves that he was 
under the corrupt influence of France.. ."61 
The Federalist interpretation of Vindication was predictable. Alexander 
Hamilton's critique of Vindication to George Washington considered it "an admission of 
guilt," and noted that the "attempts against you are viewed by all whom I have seen, as 
base." Hamilton advised Washington not to respond to the publication. Practical analysis 
of the situation has led most historians to agree that Washington could not respond to 
Vindication without implicating himself in the intrigue, or appearing argumentative 
against a well documented and cleverly presented legal argument made by one of the 
most prominent lawyers of the early republic. Randolph's defense was striking because 
he had not hidden behind a pseudonym, but had invested his name in a very public attack 
on George Washington. Any response made by the president could lend credit to 
Randolph's charges and further risk the president's honor in public. Under the 
eighteenth-century rules of etiquette for a "paper war," Washington was better served by 
his own silence. The president's loyal supporters would have been expected to take the 
field and argue against Randolph for him, as with Peter Porcupine and his paper war with 
Randolph, allowing Washington to retain his traditional position "above the fray," 
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without risk to his own reputation. As the final act in the affair of honor, Washington 
was unable to respond. 
Contemporary critics of Vindication recognized the ritual affair of honor between 
the President and the Secretary of State as they invoked the eighteenth-century language 
of honor in their commentaries. Although Vice-President John Adams personally 
remained unconvinced of Randolph's innocence, he observed to Abigail Adams that 
Vindication had been written in "response to some offense." General Horatio Gates 
referred to Vindication as an "able defense" of Randolph's "most degrading and 
undeserved treatment," to be "judged...by every friend of his country;" the very 
definition of a defensive pamphlet written in response to an affair of honor. The 
Honorable Benjamin Howard thought that "General Washington.. .had treated 
Randolph.. .with shocking rudeness and injustice," as he read Randolph's refutation of 
"the charges brought against his integrity;" injustice implied a challenge and the mention 
of integrity made it an affair of honor. 
The best evidence that Randolph's defense of his honor was, in fact, successful is 
in his life after he left public office and returned to Virginia. Immediately following the 
December, 1795, publication of Vindication, Randolph resumed his legal practice in 
Richmond. Conway described Randolph's return to private practice as a "passing from 
poverty to wealth," as he was once again able to earn an income without the hindrance of 
public service and its paltry compensation. Within a year he had begun to dominate the 
case load of the Virginia Court of Appeals and by 1800 Randolph argued fully fifty 
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percent of all cases brought before that court. Randolph continued to dominate the court 
for a full decade, fulfilling Washington's 1789 prediction that federal service as attorney 
general would eventually prove lucrative by enhancing his private practice later. 
After his return to private practice, "Randolph's most publicized appearance 
before the federal courts was as a member of the defensive counsel in the treason trial of 
Aaron Burr."65 Burr's defense panel grew to more than six lawyers with Burr chairing the 
defense himself, leaving Randolph few, if any duties. However, Randolph's reputation as 
a jurist made his name and presence a valuable asset to the panel, validating his 
successful return to private life. It was not until his wife's death in 1809 and his own 
failing health in 1810, at the age of fifty-seven, that Randolph began to withdraw from 
his practice. If Randolph had failed to achieve justice in his defensive pamphlet he would 
have been ostracized by his peers in Virginia, rather than welcomed and embraced "at the 
head of the bar" as "one of the greatest intellects of his time." Events indicate that 
Randolph's Vindication successfully preserved his personal honor which allowed him to 
continue with his legal practice and his livelihood. 
By initiating an affair of honor with Randolph, George Washington successfully 
controlled the publication of Dispatch no. 10. Protected under the flag of honor, Dispatch 
no. 10 was not made public for four months, well after the national crisis over Jay's 
Treaty had subsided, though not disappeared. As Washington had predicted, Randolph 
obtained the missing French dispatches and mounted a thoroughly documented and well 
reasoned defense. The result was a candid public analysis of Dispatch no. 10 which 
explained the actions of Washington's cabinet during the Whiskey Rebellion, rather than 
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an anonymous, random posting of the dispatch which would have invited speculation. 
Conway even suggested that Randolph's defense was actually structured to provide a 
defense of Washington's actions as much as his own. 
If Dispatch no. 10 had been anonymously posted by the British Foreign Ministry 
or Randolph's political enemies Randolph's honor would have been disgraced publicly 
and he would certainly have been forced out of public office by the scandal. Without a 
specific accuser Randolph would not have had a man of honor from whom to extract 
vindication, which would have meant the permanent loss of his reputation, dooming him 
to obscurity in eighteenth-century America. Washington's affair of honor crucially 
provided his most loyal friend an opponent with whom to duel and to demand justice. 
Although Randolph's public service was at a certain end, George Washington found a 
way for him to leave office with his honor intact. Washington's challenge also furnished 
his faithful servant with unlimited access to public records needed for his defense. As a 
man of honor, George Washington could not have given even the appearance that he had 
in any way hindered the defense of his opponent. Therefore, his instructions to secretaries 
Wolcott and Pickering to provide all materials requested by Randolph during an affair of 
honor could not be questioned. If anyone other than Washington had challenged 
Randolph, he would have had fewer resources with which to defend himself. 
It appears that after Randolph's initial rage from the insult to his honor subsided 
later in life, he may have appreciated the hidden benevolence of his mentor's challenge. 
There is no record of Washington and Randolph having any contact prior to 
Washington's passing in 1799; however, Moncure Daniel Conway cited Randolph's 1808 
History of Virginia as evidence that Randolph forgave Washington posthumously. 
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Randolph's History glowingly depicted Washington as a patriot of outstanding character 
and sound judgment throughout the revolutionary years. Randolph's manuscript of his 
History was prefaced with the inscription; "I rejoice that I have lived to do justice to the 
character of George Washington." While writing his History Randolph wrote to 
Washington's nephew, Bushrod Washington, and stated that "he did not retain the 
smallest degree of that feeling which had aroused him fifteen years before against certain 
individuals." Randolph further expressed his own contrition for having allowed his anger 
to rule his judgment and "to use some of those expressions respecting him [George 
Washington]," which were "inconsistent with his subsequent conviction." 
Utilizing Joanne Freeman's twenty-first century scholarship on eighteenth-
century affairs of honor allows us to view for the first time the President of the United 
States locked in an affair of honor with the Secretary of State. George Washington and 
Edmund Randolph each followed the ritual code of an affair of honor, from their words to 
their deeds. Although the "uncharacteristic rudeness" of the president and the caustic 
emotional outbursts of Vindication appear out of context to modern readers, their actions 
and words were in perfect keeping with eighteenth-century American politics and its code 
of honor. Placing the events of 1795 within the framework of an affair of honor clarifies 
many previously held misconceptions. 
George Washington's ambush of Edmund Randolph on the morning of 19 August 
1795 was not meant to discern Randolph's guilt or innocence based upon his reaction to 
being shown Dispatch no. 10, as has been postulated by Washington's biographers in the 
twentieth-century. As men of honor in eighteenth-century American politics, Washington 
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knew exactly how Randolph would respond to an allegation which challenged his 
integrity, mooting the need for speculation. The interview of 19 August was an 
intentional offense meant to initiate an affair of honor, with predictable results. 
Previous defenses of Randolph based upon translations errors made by Timothy 
Pickering are rendered irrelevant by the affair of honor. As Tachau noted, the contents of 
Dispatch no. 10 involved Washington and his cabinet during the Whiskey Rebellion, as 
much as Randolph. Washington's need to control the publication of Dispatch no. 10 was 
not based upon a few misunderstood words, but the general content of Fauchet's 
dispatch. Washington's affair of honor placed his most skillful defender in a position to 
clarify to the public the actions of 1794, which he did. 
The historiography of this incident has universally concluded incorrectly that 
Washington sacrificed Randolph's reputation in order to preserve his own; however, 
without recognizing the affair of honor it is impossible to appreciate that Washington 
actually placed his own reputation at risk under the code duello in order to allow 
Randolph to salvage his. The most common misconception which permeates the 
historiography is that Randolph's reputation was, in fact, ruined and that his Vindication 
was ineffective. However, most of the historiography of Randolph's demise ends with a 
critique of Vindication, and fails to consider Randolph's life after federal service. 
Edmund Randolph's return to the head of the Virginia bar and a thriving legal practice 
would have been impossible in eighteenth-century America for a man whose reputation 
had been crushed by dishonor. Edmund Randolph was compelled to leave public service, 
but the evidence shows that he emerged with his honor and reputation in-tact. 
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George Washington carefully orchestrated an affair of honor with a man whom 
he had known as his best friend's nephew, the son of a respected colleague, and as a man 
who had served him faithfully for twenty years. As a famous man of honor, Washington 
knew the consequences, yet his actions show that he deliberately chose to challenge 
Randolph. The results were positive for both Washington and Randolph, though they 
came at the expense of permanent, irreconcilable alienation. Washington's lack of written 
evidence explaining his actions makes it impossible to know with certainty why he chose 
an affair of honor with his most faithful servant. Washington may have simply acted 
selfishly to control the publication of Dispatch no. 10. It appears at least plausible, if not 
more likely, that Washington risked his own honor to save the honor of a man he loved as 
a devoted friend and tacitly adopted son. This was not merely a presidential affair of 
honor. It was a veritable duel between father and son. 
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EPILOGUE 
Edmund Randolph was a patriot and a founding father in every sense. On the eve 
of the American Revolution Randolph chose Virginia and America over the protests of 
his loyalist father, the last royal attorney general of Virginia. Abandoned by his family as 
they fled to England, Randolph turned to military service with General Washington at 
Cambridge during the siege of Boston and entered public service to Virginia and the 
nation for the next twenty years: Virginia's first attorney general; Governor of Virginia; 
attended both the Annapolis Convention and the Constitutional Convention; the first 
attorney general of the United States and the second U.S. Secretary of State. Edmund 
Randolph's pedigree undoubtedly qualifies him as a member of the founding generation, 
yet the American memory has all but obliterated him from the American past. 
Edmund Randolph was at least partially to blame for his removal from U.S. 
history. Although he was a sponsor of the Constitutional Convention, named George 
Washington to the Virginia delegation, and presented his best friend, James Madison's 
famous "Virginia Plan" for the form of government, Governor Edmund Randolph did not 
sign the federal constitution. Randolph disagreed with the ratification process accepted by 
the convention, and under protest refused to sign the final document.1 Randolph's name 
therefore does not appear on a principle founding document permanently belying his 
substantial contributions as a founding father. After Randolph's imbroglio as Secretary of 
State forced his resignation from public office, his political enemies made sure that 
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Randolph's name remained buried, and the historiography of Edmund Randolph has been 
tainted ever since. 
The preponderance of literature over two centuries makes it unlikely that Edmund 
Randolph can be rehabilitated in the American memory. However, a closer analysis of 
Randolph's affair of 1795 has revealed that his demise from public office was more than 
a personal tragedy, if it was a tragedy at all. As the Secretary of State during the French 
Revolution and war in Europe, Edmund Randolph dared to define the United States as a 
sovereign nation and demanded equal diplomatic status with European nations, a task 
which his more famous predecessor and cousin, Thomas Jefferson, had failed to 
accomplish. Randolph's strenuous defense of U.S. sovereignty combined with President 
Washington's strategic view of the United States with respect to its borders, General 
Wayne's credible military presence to enforce the will of the government, and 
congressional support of a standing army to compel Great Britain to abandon its 
nefarious plans to control the interior of the North American continent. Edmund 
Randolph thus invited the wrath of the British Empire upon himself, as the British 
Foreign Secretary devised and implemented a plan to remove the American Secretary of 
State from office. 
Closer examination of Randolph's affair has also demonstrated that the revelation 
of the incriminating French Dispatch no. 10 to George Washington in August, 1795, had 
no bearing upon his decision to ratify Jay's Treaty. Dispelling the myth, originated by 
Edmund Randolph and perpetuated by historians ever since, that George Washington 
immediately reversed his stated position not to sign Jay's Treaty during British seizures 
of U.S. shipping simply because he was shown Dispatch no. 10 and lost faith in Edmund 
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Randolph, re-inserts Washington into the history of Jay's Treaty as a sentient, well 
informed statesman formulating well thought out decisions in the best interest of the 
Unites States. 
Applying eighteenth-century political thought and the unwritten yet ubiquitous 
code of honor which ruled the early republic finally portrays the Randolph affair more 
accurately as it was understood by the founding generation; as an affair of honor. Viewed 
as an affair of honor the Randolph affair of 1795 moots centuries of speculation over 
whether or not George Washington personally believed in Randolph's guilt or innocence, 
and allows historians to accept the abundant evidence, as well as contemporary 
testimony, of Randolph's innocence. Establishing or proving Randolph innocent of the 
charges of treasonable corruption will not rehabilitate Edmund Randolph in the American 
memory, but it can clarify the historical record. 
Edmund Randolph was an important nexus to the events of the early republic. 
Moving the Randolph affair from the appendixes of Jay's Treaty, the margins of the 
Whiskey Rebellion, and the footnotes of the Federalist Era portrays a more accurate 
history of the early republic. Re-establishing Edmund Randolph as the credible jurist that 
he was may invite further study of his significant contributions to U.S. constitutional law, 
and his firm commitment to the concept of state sovereignty with respect to the federal 
government; opinions that guided Randolph and his counsel to George Washington as 
they set many of the legal, constitutional precedents of the early republic. 
The Randolph affair may ultimately be seen as Washington's final defeat at the 
hands of the British; a defeat not on the battle field, but in the political arena. The British 
Foreign Ministry conspired to remove Edmund Randolph from George Washington's 
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cabinet, depriving him of his most faithful and longest serving advisor. The debate over 
Jay's Treaty raged long after Randolph had returned to Virginia and private practice. The 
House of Representatives challenged the funding of the treaty into 1796 and debated 
impeaching Washington on the floor of the house. Public opinion of Washington flagged 
as increasingly hostile attacks upon his fidelity to the nation appeared in print. During 
the most contentious and challenging years of his public life, the embattled president was 
surrounded by veritable strangers. James Thomas Flexner painted the scene when he 
depicted an "elderly president.. .left naked among his enemies."3 Washington's final 
defeat by the British was, in the end, the political alienation of his most faithful servant 
during his greatest time of need. 
2
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